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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, commentators have expressed serious
concerns with the state of the law governing awards of reasonable
royalties as damages in patent infringement cases. These
concerns range from uncertainty related to the underlying
rationale and methodology for calculating reasonable royalties,1
misplaced use of reasonable royalties to punish infringers,
2
excessive awards, 3 and the creation of incentives for abusive
negotiation and litigation tactics.4
Given these concerns, the proper assessment of royalties has
been a recent, frequent topic for debate among economists and
legal scholars. Economists have challenged basic premises of the
law governing reasonable royalties and injunctions based on
various economic theories and insights. 5 Similarly, legal scholars
1 See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 644 (2010) ("Reasonable royalty
damage awards are a mess. Damage awards, rationales, and percentages are widely
disparate, reflecting an uncertain legal environment and very little oversight of jury fact-
finding.").
2 See, e.g., Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Pateat
Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 910-11 (2009) ("This Article documents the
striking fact that courts have time and again awarded reasonable royalty damages for
patent infringement that rise well above any objectively 'reasonable' level for the apparent
purpose of punishing defendants for their infringing conduct.").
3 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2035 (2007) (employing an economic model for analyzing patent holdup
and royalty stacking to support their "strong[] belie[f] that the threat of holdup gives
excessive reward to patent holders").
4 See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 307 (2006) ("[C]ourts
have failed to define standards to align damages with the patentee's harm. As a result, the
damages awarded for patent infringement far exceed the amount that the patent is worth.
These circumstances create incentives for patentees to 'game' the patent system by seeking
large damages and settlement jackpots from those accused of infringement.").
5 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Making Sense of 'Apportionment" in Patent
Damages, 12 COLUM. ScI. & TECH. L. REV. 255, 259 (2011) (analyzing apportionment as the
proper solution to problematic damage awards and suggesting that "the reasonable royalty
award (in dollars) should reflect the incremental value (in dollars) of the patented
technology to the defendant as compared to the next best alternative"); Michael J.
Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA 313,
336 (2009) (arguing that settlement licenses should be considered in reasonable royalty
determinations); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to
Systematically Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 537-45 (2008)
(employing economic analysis to critique the Lemley-Shapiro economic model for analyzing
patent holdup and royalty stacking); John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The
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have reassessed the governing law and, in particular, traditional
methodologies for calculating reasonable royalties.6
Hypothetical Negotiation and Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 769, 829 (2013) (proposing an alternative framework for calculating
damages that focuses on "the contributions of the patent, licensing comparables, and
design-around costs"); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2163-64 (2007) (defending their economic model); John W.
Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better Alternatives for the Courts
and Congress, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 19, 23 (2009) (contending that the better
approach to the reasonable royalties analysis involves calculating "the difference between
the net profits the infringer earned from sales of the infringing product and net profits it
could have earned using the next best non-infringing substitute"); Carl Shapiro,
Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 308 (2010)
(describing an economic model identifying basic elements of the hold-up component of
negotiated royalties); J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of
Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV.
714, 747-48 (2008) (critiquing the Lemley-Shapiro model of patent holdup and royalty
stacking); Hal J. Singer & Kyle Smith, What Does an Economist Have to Say About the
Calculation of Reasonable Royalties?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 7, 21 (2009) (analyzing
various economic models used for calculating royalties and finding that none of them "give
definitive guidance on estimating reasonable royalties").
6 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in
Patent Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 727
(2011) [hereinafter Cotter, Four Principles] (reassessing the traditional methodologies for
determining reasonable royalties and proposing four principles that courts should consider
in awarding reasonable royalties); Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and
Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1152-54 (2009) [hereinafter Cotter, Patent
Holdup] (summarizing critiques of patent holdup analyses and explaining the relationship
between patent law and antitrust law); Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 629-33 (critiquing
the Georgia-Pacific test for calculating reasonable royalty damages); John M. Golden,
Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2160 (2007)
[hereinafter Golden, "Patent Trolls'1 (questioning "the wisdom of an approach to permanent
injunctions that categorically discriminates against noncompeting patent holders"); John M.
Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 591-92 (2010) [hereinafter
Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies] (offering fundamental principles to evaluate and
improve patent remedies); Landers, supra note 4, at 328-31 (providing an overview of
approaches to measuring royalties); Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee
Injury, and Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 489-90 (2012) (concluding
that apportionment is the proper approach for compensating patent holders); Mark A.
Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655,
656 (2009) (discussing the difference between reasonable royalties and lost profits and
concluding that a clear delineation between the two would prevent overcompensation);
Love, supra note 2, at 916-23 (disagreeing with the use of inflated reasonable royalty
awards as a means of deterring patent infringement); Christopher B. Seaman,
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010
BYU L. REV. 1661, 1666-67 (finding the Georgia-Pacific standard for determining
reasonable royalties problematic and proposing an approach based on the infringer's
expected costs of adopting a non-infringing substitute).
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At the same time, all three branches of the federal government
have studied ways to improve the law governing reasonable
royalties. Courts have confronted and resolved a few targeted
challenges to particular methodologies for calculating reasonable
royalties. 7 Congress has considered more sweeping change in the
form of legislative proposals that would affect either the
substantive test or the procedural rules governing the
determination of reasonable royalties.8  President Obama
expanded a program designed to bring academic experts to the
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to conduct research,9 and
the USPTO subsequently called for proposals addressing "the
successes, failures, and avenues for improvement of the current
7 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
("This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of thumb
is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation."); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(rejecting calls by legal scholars to eliminate use of the entire market value rule in
reasonable royalty calculations).
8 Prior to passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011), Congress considered amending, but ultimately did not amend, the relevant
statutory section to codify a particular substantive approach to determining reasonable
royalties that would have emphasized apportionment. For one analysis of the then.pending
legislation, see generally Erick S. Lee, Historical Perspectives on Reasonable Royalty Patent
Damages and Current Congressional Efforts for Reform, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009).
More recently, the House of Representatives passed legislation introduced by Bob Goodlatte
that focuses on procedure. See Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Comm., House Passes Innovation Act to Make Reforms to our Patent System (Dec. 5, 2013),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2013/12/house-passes-innovation-act-to-ma
ke-reforms-to-our-patent-system. The legislation would have compelled the Judicial
Conference of the United States to "develop rules and procedures ... to address the
asymmetries in discovery burdens and costs" in patent cases. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309,
113th Cong. § 6(a)(1) (2013). One of the proposed reforms would have set a default rule
seeking to limit early discovery regarding damages issues in most cases to documents
"sufficient to show profit attributable to the claimed invention of the patent or patents at
issue." Id. § 6(a)(3)(A)(i)(V). The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, however,
ultimately removed the bill from the committee's agenda. See Press Release, Comment of
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., On Patent Legislation
(May 21, 2014), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-patrick-
leahy-d-vtchairman-senate-judiciary-committee-on-patent-legislation.
9 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: White House
Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/20 13/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues
(announcing expansion of the Edison Scholars Program "to develop-and make available to
the public-more robust data and research on the issues bearing on abusive litigation").
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approaches for calculating damages" in patent cases.10 At the
same time, the President's Council of Economic Advisers, National
Economic Council, and Office of Science and Technology Policy
released a joint report concluding that "the best approach to
resolving today's patent troll problem is... to reduce the extent to
which legal rules allow patent owners to capture a
disproportionate share of returns to investment."11  In addition,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a report rethinking
practically every facet of the law governing damages in patent
cases, 12 conducted a joint workshop on patent assertion entities
with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice that
considered the economics of patent licensing,1 3 and announced that
it will conduct a formal study of patent assertion entities and their
licensing activities. 14
Despite all of this concern, debate, and study, the federal
government, to date, has not implemented any major reform of the
law governing reasonable royalties.1 5 States, however, have taken
10 Call for Proposals, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Thomas Alva Edison Visiting
Scholars Program Expansion (on file with author) (seeking proposals from "scholars in
intellectual property, innovation, economics, and related fields" for research topics, and
listing as an example "the successes, failures, and avenues for improvement of the current
approaches for calculating damages in IP litigation-e.g., the Georgia-Pacific framework
and how.., these approaches [are] related to issues of royalty stacking and hold-up").
11 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 13 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf.
12 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 177-212 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/
03/ll0307patentreport.pdf (evaluating proposed reforms to the law governing reasonable
royalties).
13 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Federal Trade Commission to Hold Workshop on
Patent Assertion Entity Activities (Nov. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/press releases/2012/288932.htm.
14 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities
and Their Impact on Innovation, Competition (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/2013/09/paestudy.shtm.
15 As of this writing, the only reform directly linked to the law governing the assessment
of reasonable royalties has been the Federal Circuit's jettison of the 25% rule of thumb
previously used by some damages experts testifying in patent infringement cases. See
Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act did not include any reform directly related to reasonable royalties. See
generally Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). And while President Obama recently
announced a handful of executive actions "to help bring about greater transparency to the
patent system and level the playing field for innovators," none implement reform
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unprecedented action. Vermont's attorney general, for example,
sued a patent owner for engaging in unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 16 Among other things, the attorney general alleged that
statements in letters sent to accused infringers would likely lead
the recipients to believe that prior licensing agreements between
the patent owner and third parties established that an identified
price for a license was fair when, in reality, the average licensing
fee was less. 17 Vermont subsequently amended its consumer
protection statute, making it an express violation of the statute to
make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.18 Notably,
according to the amended statute, bad faith may be supported by
evidence that a patent owner "offers to license [its] patent for an
amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of
the license."19 Thus, efforts to ensure that accused infringers pay
patent owners fair and reasonable compensation for use of
patented technology has not abated but only intensified in the
virtual absence of direct federal action on point.
If the relevant decisionmakers in governments decide to
address concerns associated with determinations of royalties for
specifically directed to the assessment of reasonable royalties. Press Release, The White
House, Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 9.
16 See generally Consumer Protection Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, No.
282-5-13 Wncv (Vt. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2013).
17 Id. at 9-10. Other states' attorneys general have taken similar steps. See, e.g., Press
Release, Office of the Minn. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Lori Swanson Announces First-in-
the-Nation Order to Stop Delaware Company from "Patent Trolling" in Minnesota (Aug. 20,
2013), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Panel-17b Documents.pdf (requiring
MPHJ Technology Investments to cease patent trolling in the state); News Release, Office of
the Neb. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Bruning Investigating "Patent Trolls" (July 18, 2013),
available at http://www.ago.ne.gov/resources/dyni/files/1069520z2e735d6e/_fn/071813+Brun
ing+Patent+Troll+Release+.pdf (announcing investigation into patent enforcement efforts
by a Texas law firm). But see Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle BanCorp, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d
1157, 1169 (D. Neb. 2013) (granting a preliminary injunction against Nebraska's attorney
general and two of his employees to prevent them from enforcing a cease and desist order to
"prevent or impede the [patent owner's law] firm from representing [the patent owner] in
connection with licensing and litigation of U.S. patents").
18 See H. 299, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 72d Sess. (Vt. 2013) (codified as amended at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199) (amending the state's consumer protection law to "facilitate the
efficient and prompt resolution of patent infringement claims, protect Vermont businesses
from abusive and bad faith assertions of patent infringement, and build Vermont's economy,
while at the same time respecting federal law and being careful to not interfere with
legitimate patent enforcement actions" by targeting "bad faith assertion[s] of patent
infringement").
19 Id. § 4197(b)(5).
86 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:79
patent infringement directly,20 there are two primary avenues for
reform. The first focuses on reasonable royalties themselves, that
is, royalties determined by courts. The second focuses on
negotiated royalties-royalties agreed upon by parties. While the
first avenue for reform would seek to ensure that courts efficiently
and accurately award reasonable royalties, the second avenue for
reform would seek to ensure that parties efficiently and accurately
negotiate royalties.
In this Article, I focus on the first avenue for reform-the effort
to ensure that courts efficiently and accurately award reasonable
royalties-by identifying and exploring two basic paradigms for
calculating reasonable royalties: valuing patent rights and valuing
patented technology. The traditional paradigm, valuing patent
rights, reflects a tort law make-whole conception of compensatory
damages. 21 Applying it, courts award patent owners the value of
their lost royalties-the royalties they would have obtained from
infringers had the infringers licensed rather than infringed the
patent owners' patents.22 As I will show, however, these lost
royalties reflect both the value of use of patented technology and
20 There are many indirect ways to address concerns regarding the assessment of
royalties for patent infringement. For example, the potential for excessive royalties may be
reduced by improving the quality of issued patents, reducing the cost of patent infringement
litigation, improving notice to potential infringers, and staying injunctions in appropriate
circumstances. Some of these reforms have already taken place, see, e.g., Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (establishing new post grant
review proceedings to improve patent quality and creating a new statutory section
restricting joinder of accused infringers to reduce the cost of patent litigation), and the
relevant decisionmakers have considered these types of reforms to combat problems
specifically related to patent trolls, see Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives
Judiciary Comm., supra note 8 ("This bipartisan bill take steps to combat the ever
increasing problem of abusive patent litigation.").
21 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546-47 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(adopting a tort law make-whole conception of compensatory damages for patent
infringement, which allowed for compensation based on sales of a device not covered by the
patent-in-suit); see also Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of "Private Law" Remedies, 92
TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2014) ("[P]atent remedies mirror traditional tort law remedies by
attempting to restore the patentee to the status quo ante-namely, the state of the world in
which there is no infringement of the patent.").
22 See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) ("A reasonable royalty is the amount that 'a person, desiring to manufacture[,
use, or] sell a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a
royalty and yet be able to make[, use, or] sell the patented article, in the market, at a
reasonable profit.'" (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95
F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1938))).
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the value of the patent owners' rights to seek and obtain judicial
remedies for patent infringement, such as injunctive relief,
enhanced damages, and attorneys' fees.23  By contrast, the
alternative paradigm, valuing patented technology, reflects only
the value of the use of patented technology.24
To understand the difference between valuing patent rights and
valuing patented technology, consider the following stylized
example. Suppose a patent owner has a very strong case against
an infringer, a case so strong that it is a virtual certainty that the
court will award a judgment, including not only the patent owner's
lost profits but also an award of treble damages 25 and attorneys'
fees for willful infringement. 26 Suppose further that it is a virtual
certainty that the court will award $4 million ($1 million in lost
profits on sales of 1 million devices at $1 of marginal profit per
device, trebled, plus $1 million in attorneys' fees). Next, suppose
that it is a virtual certainty that the court will award an
injunction, and that the injunction will enable the patent owner to
increase its profits over the term of the patent in an amount of $6
million (on sales of 6 million additional devices at $1 of marginal
profit per device).27 In these circumstances, the value to the
patent owner 28 of its patent rights against this particular
23 See infra Part II.A.
24 1 use the terminology, "valuing patented technology," to distinguish this form of
valuation from what I call the "valuation of patent rights." Technically, however, when I
say "valuing patented technology," I refer to valuing use of patented technology. By statute,
a reasonable royalty is tied to the particular use of the patented technology by the infringer.
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (allowing for "a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer" (emphasis added)). A reasonable royalty does not represent the
present value of every future use of patented technology, but only the particular use made
by a particular infringer.
25 See id. (providing that a "court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed").
26 See id. § 285 (providing for "reasonable attorney fees").
27 Technically, this amount should be the present value of the actual profit spread out
over the entire remaining term of the patent.
28 From the perspective of the infringer, the value of the patent owner's patent rights will
be different. For example, the infringer's past and future profitability associated with use
of the patented technology may be different than the patent owner's profitability; the
infringer would incur its own attorneys' fees negotiating and litigating any dispute between
the parties; and the prospect of an injunction may cause the infringer switching costs to
change from the infringing technology to a non-infringing technology. The difference in the
value of the patent rights to the patent owner and the infringer is a form of arbitrage, at
least a portion of which the patent owner may be able to capture by settling the dispute
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infringer, ignoring other potential value,29 is $10 million ($4
million plus $6 million). But the value of the patent owner's use of
the patented technology-the patent owner's lost and future profit
attributable to the patented invention-is only $7 million ($1
million plus $6 million). The $3 million difference represents the
value of the ability to obtain a judgment trebling the patent
owner's damages and recovering the patent owner's attorneys'
fees-in other words, the value of certain legal rights against this
infringer.
While it is easy to see the difference between the value of patent
rights and the value of patented technology in this stylized
example, the difference may not be as easy to recognize in other
more realistic and complex situations. If this patent owner and
infringer settled their litigation for $10 million, for example, it is
impossible to know how much of the $10 million represents the
value of use of the patented technology without knowing all of the
details of the basis for this settlement. This is problematic. And
knowing only some of the details may be even more problematic.
For example, if one knows only the settlement amount ($10
million) and the number of infringing sales (1 million), one may
come to the incorrect conclusion that the value of use of the
patented technology would be $10 per infringing sale ($10 million
divided by 1 million). Moreover, real situations do include more
complexities. As an example, in real situations there is not
certainty as to liability, and parties base their settlements on the
expected value of future judgments, with discounts based on risk
associated with the ability of the patent owner to prove that the
infringer is liable for infringement of a patent claim that is not
invalid or unenforceable. 30  Significantly, the extent of these
between the parties. For simplicity, I ignore the ability of the patent owner to capitalize on
this arbitrage in my example.
29 There are no doubt other sources of value to the patent owner. For example, as
described in the preceding footnote, the patent owner may be able to capitalize on arbitrage
created by increased value of the patent rights to the infringer. See supra note 28. As
another example, publicity associated with any judgment may cause other actual and
potential infringers not to infringe, a valuable result from the perspective of the patent
owner.
30 See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, SETTLEMENT OF PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTES:
IMPROVING DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS TO SETTLE AND LICENSE 15-16 (Am. Bar Ass'n ed.,
2011) (asserting that the uncertainty involved in patent litigation requires parties to
[Vol. 49:79
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discounts reflects the value of the patent rights, not the value of
the patented technology.
With this distinction between valuing patent rights and valuing
patented technology in mind, the alternative paradigm this Article
explores is the latter: the idea that reasonable royalties assessed in
patent infringement litigation should reflect only the value of use of
the patented technology. Indeed, this alternative paradigm-that
reasonable royalties should reflect the value of patented technology
rather than patent rights-in several ways explains the course of
the common law governing the method for calculating reasonable
royalties. It also comports with the three public policies identified
by courts as guiding the award of reasonable royalties: preventing
injustice by avoiding undercompensation of patent owners;31
eliminating incentives to infringe and litigate;32 and providing
optimal incentives to invent.33  Moreover, valuing patented
technology as opposed to patent rights has significant benefits. It
eliminates circularity in the determination of reasonable royalties
and its associated problems of undercompensation and
overcompensation of patent owners; increases guidance, and
therefore accuracy, by decisionmakers; reduces uncertainty and
unpredictability; bounds expert testimony and improves substantive
review of reasonable royalty determinations; and may reduce the
cost of these determinations.
As I will show, courts developed the remedy of reasonable
royalties to correct what they sensed as injustice associated with
undercompensation of patent owners. 34 This undercompensation
occurred due to methods of valuation that focused on the value of
patent rights rather than the value of patented technologies. In
particular, courts developed the remedy of reasonable royalties to
replace nominal damages, which merely recognized a violation of
"decide whether to settle by comparing the value or cost of settlement to the expected value
or expected cost of litigation to judgment").
31 See U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) (reasoning that an
award of nominal damages may be "repellent to the sense of justice").
32 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158-59 (6th Cir.
1978) (highlighting the risk that a potential licensee might simply use the invention, aware
of possible litigation, if a prospective damages award merely equals a foregone royalty).
33 See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
34 See infra Part IV.A.
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the patent owner's proven right to exclude. 35 Nominal damages-
by definition-altogether ignored the value of the patented
technology. Courts also used the remedy of reasonable royalties to
replace negotiated royalties when those negotiated royalties
reflected large discounts based on the perceived inability of patent
owners to enforce their rights because of potential invalidity.36
Thus, with both nominal damages and discounted negotiated
royalties, courts believed the monetary awards insufficiently
compensated the patent owners, and their adjustments of these
awards moved reasonable royalties in the direction of the true
value of the patented technology and away from the value of the
patent owner's legal rights.
More recently, however, scholars' analyses of the relationship
between reasonable royalties and negotiated royalties have
focused on the possibility of overcompensation of patent owners. 37
As I will show, these scholars have highlighted different methods
of calculating royalties that similarly ignore the value of the
patented technology and instead focus on the value of the rights
associated with patent ownership. For example, they highlight the
possibility that negotiated royalties will reflect "patent holdup"
and "royalty stacking" based on the ability of patent holders to
extract value from sunk costs and complementary technologies by
threatening accused infringers with injunctions.38 To the extent
that reasonable royalties reflect these negotiated royalties and do
not correct for patent holdup and royalty stacking, then these
scholars believe reasonable royalties likewise overcompensate
patent owners.
The overarching point is that these concerns with
undercompensation and overcompensation fade when the focus
remains on the value of patented technology, rather than on the
value of patent rights. Thus, in this Article, I consider several
reforms that would tie the law governing reasonable royalty
determinations even closer to the value of patented technology.
These potential reforms include: elimination of the hypothetical
negotiation construct that predominates reasonable royalty
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 See infra Part III.B.
37 See infra Part V.B.2.
38 See infra Part V.B.2.
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determinations; the use of additional assumptions within the
existing hypothetical negotiation construct; and, more generally,
the need to adjust negotiated royalties that often form the basis for
reasonable royalty calculations. 39 I also highlight several open
questions related to full adoption of the fundamental paradigm of
valuing patented technology.
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part II explains the
conceptual framework of valuing patented technology rather than
valuing patent rights. Part III studies the historical development
of awards of reasonable royalties, and how the law has already
moved toward valuing patented technology and away from valuing
patent rights. Part IV considers the public policies guiding awards
of reasonable royalties in patent infringement cases and,
specifically, how valuing patented technology furthers these public
policies. Part V analyzes the reforms that would be necessary to
adopt fully the paradigm of valuing patented technology. Part VI
explores how this paradigm may eliminate or at least mitigate
problems plaguing the current state of the law. Part VII responds
to some potential objections to valuing patented technology rather
than valuing patent rights.
II. VALUING PATENT RIGHTS VERSUS VALUING PATENTED
TECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Patent law has been moving toward using reasonable royalties
to value patented technology rather than patent rights, but it has
not quite arrived at this destination. Before exploring this
progression, it is helpful to clarify what is meant by valuing patent
rights versus valuing patented technology.
A. VALUING PATENT RIGHTS
The quintessential patent right is commonly thought to be the
right to exclude. 40 The Patent Act itself provides that "[e]very
patent shall contain.., a grant to the patentee ... of the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
39 See generally Part V.B (discussing these reforms).
40 See, e.g., Thomas Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent -Antitrust
Interface, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 385, 416 (2013) ("The quintessential patent right
is the right to exclude.").
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invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States ... ."41 This right to exclude is a negative
right, not a positive right.42 A patent does not give its owner any
right to use the patented invention.43 Rather, it gives its owner a
right to exclude others' use of the patented invention.44 Without
qualification, this seems to indicate that a patent grants an
inviolable right to exclude.
But a patent, in a very real sense, gives its owner the right to
seek to exclude others from using the patented invention. An
assertion of patent infringement is subject to numerous defenses
allowing alleged infringers to challenge whether the patent owner
may exclude use of the invention. These defenses include
statutory45 as well as non-statutory defenses. 46 Furthermore, even
if a patent owner proves its patent infringement claim is not
subject to any defense, a court may decline to impose an injunction
prohibiting use of the invention based on equitable
considerations. 47
Patent rights, furthermore, extend beyond the right to seek to
exclude others from using the patented invention; patent owners
may also obtain monetary remedies for patent infringement.
These monetary remedies include damages 48 and attorneys' fees.49
41 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). This statutory section goes on to explain that "if the
invention is a process" the patent also includes a right to exclude similar conduct. Id.
42 See, e.g., CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 1 (3d ed. 2013) ("A patent gives its




45 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (listing defenses).
46 There are numerous examples of non-statutory equitable defenses to assertions of
patent infringement. See, e.g., Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (recognizing an equitable estoppel defense); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (recognizing the inequitable conduct
defense).
47 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) ('The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title
may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (describing a four-part equitable test to
determine whether a patent owner should obtain an injunction against an infringer).
48 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest
and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall
[Vol. 49:79
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Importantly, these monetary remedies also are not inviolable.
They depend on successfully overcoming the same defenses, plus
others, including a time limitation on damages 50 and a notice
requirement.51 Thus, it is more accurate to conceive of a patent as
giving its owner rights to seek remedies for use of patented
technology, where potential remedies include both monetary and
injunctive relief.52
Significantly, the rights to seek monetary and injunctive relief
effectively give a patent owner the ability to impose negotiation
and litigation costs on potential infringers. If a potential infringer
will not voluntarily stop using a patent owner's patented
technology or pay for past use of the patented technology, the
patent owner may sue the potential infringer in federal court.
53
The negotiations and litigation will disrupt the potential
infringer's business activities. So too will they disrupt the patent
owner's business activities; the patent owner itself will also have
opportunity costs associated with exercising its patent rights. And
for both parties, the costs associated with patent infringement
litigation-both direct and indirect costs-may be substantial.
54
assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.").
49 Id. § 285 ('The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.").
50 Id. § 286 ("Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or
counterclaim for infringement in the action.").
51 Id. § 287(a) ("In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the
patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of
the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.").
52 This conception of patent rights is not dependent on certainty regarding validity of the
patent; these rights exist upon the issuance of the patent and do not depend upon certainty
that the patent will not be later declared invalid. See Alan C. Marco & Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 104-05 (2013) ("[T]he right to
exclude is more precisely a right to sue with some probability of success."); Mark A. Lemley
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 (2005) ("[E]conomists have
increasingly recognized that a patent does not confer upon its owner the right to exclude but
rather a right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court .. " (citation omitted)).
53 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent.").
54 See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at 34-36
(2013) (reporting results of survey regarding direct litigation costs and listing a median cost
of $2 million for all patent infringements lawsuits with between $1 million and $10 million
at risk).
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Based on this understanding of patent rights, the value of these
rights is the amount of money a patent owner can obtain based
upon the difference between a world where its patent rights do not
exist and a world where its patent rights do exist. It is the ability
of a patent owner to take advantage of (a) the existence of
potential remedies for patent infringement, including both
injunctive and monetary relief, and (b) the ability to impose
negotiation and litigation costs on potential infringers when
seeking to obtain those remedies. The patent owner may take
advantage of the existence of these potential remedies and the
ability to impose costs on potential infringers either by agreeing to
license the patented technology or by obtaining and enforcing a
judgment granting injunctive relief, monetary relief, or both
against an infringer.
The value of patent rights thus depends upon many factors,
several of which incorporate a substantial degree of uncertainty.
The value of patent rights depends on the validity of the patent.55
It depends on the patent's vulnerability to equitable defenses. 56 It
depends on the ability to prove infringement, that is, use of the
patented technology. In other words, it depends on the probability
of liability.57 This probability is largely dependent upon the scope
of the patent's claims given the effect of this scope on the ability to
prove infringement and withstand challenges to validity.58 Indeed,
the broader the patent claims, the easier it is for the patent owner
to prove infringement, but also for an alleged infringer to prove
invalidity using prior art. Likewise, the narrower the patent
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty and statutory bars); § 103 (obviousness); § 112
(written description, enablement, definiteness); § 282(b) (defenses).
56 See, e.g., Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding
equitable estoppel applicable); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (recognizing the inequitable conduct defense).
57 In a recent study of stock market reactions to court decisions in patent cases, Alan
Marco and Saurabh Vishnubhakat found that "resolution of uncertainty about validity or
infringement is worth as much on average as is the initial patent right, indicating the
presence of significant legal uncertainty." Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 52, at 104.
As they explain, "uncertainty over whether title can be enforced undermines the market
value of the property right." Id. at 106.
58 Uncertainty related to scope derives from the imperfection of language as a means to
define legal rights. Various legal doctrines, however, seek to limit that uncertainty,
including the definiteness requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012), and the process of claim
construction, see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(setting out claim construction principles).
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claims, the harder it is for the patent owner to prove infringement,
but also for an alleged infringer to prove invalidity using prior art.
Moreover, the value of patent rights also depends on the
probability of obtaining a final judgment for injunctive and
monetary relief, even if liability is a certainty.5 9 And it depends on
the probability of enforcement of this final judgment.60 Beyond
these probabilities (for liability, relief, and enforceability), the
value of patent rights depends on the cost of negotiation and
litigation over allegations of patent infringement. If the patent
owner has the ability to impose more costs on potential infringers,
for example, the patent owner may be able to extract value from
potential infringers given the patent's existence. The value also
depends on the level of risk aversion of the patent owner and
potential infringers. The more risk averse a potential infringer is,
the more value the patent owner may be able to extract from the
potential infringer. Importantly, the value of patent rights also
depends on the value of the corresponding patented technology. I
turn to this last concept-the value of the patented technology-
next. But, before doing so, it is important to note that the impact
of the value of the patented technology on the value of patent
rights turns upon the expected value of the patented technology,
i.e., predictions-correct or incorrect-of the value of future use of
the patented technology.
B. VALUING PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
Patented technology is the technology described in a patent's
claims. That is, the claims define the scope of the patented
invention. 61 The value of patented technology, in turn, is the
amount of money that a user of patented technology can save or
69 Liability does not guarantee any judicial order for a remedy other than reasonable
royalties. Thus, for example, it does not guarantee any judicial order for lost profits,
enhanced damages, or injunctive relief.
60 Judicial orders for equitable or monetary remedies do not guarantee compliance with
or enforcement of these orders. Infringers may still infringe even if there is a judicial order
prohibiting it. Infringers may not pay monetary awards even if there is a judicial order
requiring it. And patent owners may not seek or obtain enforcement in instances of non-
compliance. An example is when an infringer is judgment-proof.
61 Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (' The words of the claims define the scope of the patented invention." (citing Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
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otherwise obtain based upon the difference between a world where
the patented technology is used and a world where the patented
technology is not used.
As with the value of patent rights, there is uncertainty
associated with the value of patented technology. Uncertainty
related to the scope of patent claims still exists because the claims
define what constitutes the patented technology. 62  Other
uncertainties relate to measurements or predictions of differences
between the world where the technology is used and the world
where it is not used. For instance, experts in a particular industry
may disagree over the extent to which a patented technology
reduces cost or allows its user to increase price above its costs in
the relevant market, for example based on product differentiation.
Thus, one may distinguish between expected and actual value of
patented technology. But notably, these uncertainties do not
include those related to liability (invalidity, vulnerability to
equitable defenses, and infringement), relief, or enforceability
associated with patent rights.63 Nor, under this conception, is the
value of patented technology affected by the cost of negotiation and
litigation over patent rights, or levels of risk aversion with respect
to litigation.
Now consider the significance of these conceptions of the value
of patent rights and the value of patented technology in the
context of reasonable royalties. A reasonable royalty in a
technology-focused analysis would reflect only the value of the
patented technology. A reasonable royalty in a rights-focused
analysis, by contrast, would also reflect the value the patent owner
and the accused infringer place on the remedies a court might
provide in a dispute over patent infringement, as well as
associated negotiation costs, litigation costs, and risk aversion, as I
have described. Thus, one can conceive of a range of reasonable
royalty calculations lying along a spectrum. All approaches
consider the value of the patented technology as compared with
the next best alternative technology, but at one end of the
62 Id.
63 See Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 52, at 104 ("If a patent is ruled valid, nothing
about the decision affects the value of the underlying technology; the change in value may




spectrum the calculation also takes into account the probability of
liability, relief, and enforcement as well as negotiation and
litigation costs, while at the other end of the spectrum, the
calculation ignores all of these factors. Intermediate positions tip
more or less towards one end or the other as they take some, but
not all, of these factors into account. In this Article, I will consider
which of the two ends of the spectrum the law governing
reasonable royalties reflects-a technology-focused analysis or a
rights-focused analysis-and how the law would change were it to
focus only on the value of the patented technology.
III. HISTORICAL PROGRESSION FROM VALUING PATENT RIGHTS TO
VALUING PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
As a matter of history, the law governing monetary remedies in
patent cases has moved, at least in some respects, in the direction
of valuing patented technology. But it has not yet fully abandoned
valuing patent rights. Furthermore, courts have not expressly or
intentionally moved the law in the direction of valuing patented
technology; they, for example, have not clearly explained the
distinction between valuing patent rights and valuing patented
technology. But language in opinions by the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court come close to distinguishing these concepts.
A. COURTS' RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS WITH NOMINAL DAMAGES
Courts developed the remedy of reasonable royalties in patent
infringement cases in the late 1800s and early 1900s to avoid
injustices associated with awarding nominal damages and
established royalties.6 4 In both respects, courts moved the law
64 See Lee, supra note 8, at 3-20 (collecting early cases applying the reasonable royalty
remedy). An established royalty exists when a patent owner consistently licenses others to
engage in conduct comparable to an infringer's conduct at a uniform royalty; it indicates the
terms upon which the patent owner would have licensed the infringer's use of the patented
technology. See Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889) ("[W]here there has been such a
number of sales by a patentee of licenses to make, use, and sell his patents as to establish a
regular price for a license, that price may be taken as a measure of damages against
infringers .... In order that a royalty may be accepted as a measure of damages against an
infringer, who is a stranger to the license establishing it, it must be paid or secured before
the infringement complained of; it must be paid by such a number of persons as to indicate
a general acquiescence in its reasonableness by those who have occasion to use the
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governing monetary remedies in patent cases in the direction of
valuing patented technology rather than patent rights. Consider,
first, courts' response to perceived injustices associated with
nominal damages.
Traditionally, when litigants prove liability but cannot prove
actual damages, courts award nominal damages. Indeed, the
Supreme Court often awarded nominal damages in patent cases in
the late nineteenth century.65 It did so for various reasons related
to the inability to prove actual damages: inability to prove either
lost profits given the lack of any advantage in using the patented
invention or lost royalties in the form of an established royalty;66
inability to apportion any lost profits;67 inability to prove
infringers' profits;68 inability to apportion any infringers' profits;6 9
and insufficient evidence to allow a jury to assess actual
damages. 7 0
Around the same time, however, in other patent cases the
Supreme Court avoided awarding nominal damages. The Court
did so by allowing juries to refer to "general evidence" of the patent
owners' damages in the form of "the utility and advantage of the
invention over the old modes or devices that had been used for
working out similar results"'71 and by reference to "the profit made
by the defendant and that lost by the plaintiff."72 In turn, lower
courts began replacing nominal damages with "reasonable
royalties" based on this type of evidence. 73
invention; and it must be uniform at the places where the licenses are issued."); Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (describing similar requirements to
find established royalties). Consistent with the phrase 'lost profits," established royalties
therefore might be called "lost royalties."
65 See, e.g., Black v. Thorne, 111 U.S. 122, 124 (1884) (holding that "damages must
necessarily be nominal" if the patent holder does not prove either (1) that "use of the
patented invention ... add[ed] to the gains of the infringer ... or impair[ed] the just
rewards of the inventor," or (2) that a 'license fee ha[d] been generally paid").
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 17-18 (1886); Blake v. Robertson, 94 U.S. 728,
733-34 (1876).
68 See, e.g., Rude, 130 U.S. at 167.
69 See, e.g., Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 147 (1894).
70 See, e.g., Rude, 130 U.S. at 167; New York v. Ransom, 64 U.S. 487, 488 (1859).
71 Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. 315, 320 (1865).
72 Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. 460, 462 (1873).
73 See, e.g., Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894)
(finding reasonable royalties as an adequate measure of damages in the absence of proof of
[Vol. 49:79
2014] USING REASONABLE ROYALTIES
The Supreme Court later seemed to hold that only nominal
damages should be awarded in the absence of evidence of lost
profits or established royalties.74 As a result, lower courts split on
the issue of whether reasonable royalties could be awarded in the
absence of specific evidence of lost profits or established
royalties.7 5 In 1915, however, the Supreme Court, in Dowagiac
Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., ultimately
clarified that reasonable royalties may be awarded in the absence
of specific evidence of lost profits or established royalties.
7 6
In Dowagiac, the lower courts had awarded nominal damages.
77
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the patent
owner had not proven entitlement to lost profits or an established
royalty.78 But the Court disagreed with the lower courts'
conclusion that, as a result, the patent owner should recover only
nominal damages.7 9 The Court reasoned that "[a]s the exclusive
right conferred by the patent was property, and the infringement
was a tortious taking of a part of that property, the normal
measure of damages was the value of what was taken."80 In terms
of how to measure the value of what was taken in the absence of
lost profits or an established royalty, the Court held that the
patent owner could seek to "prov[e] what would have been a
lost sales); McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 425 (1878) (concluding that a
reasonable royalty is an appropriate measure of damages).
74 Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 583 (1895) ("Upon this state of facts, the evidence
disclosing the existence of no license fee, no impairment of the plaintiffs' market, in short,
no damages of any kind, we think the court should have instructed the jury, if they found
for the plaintiffs at all, to find nominal damages only.").
75 Compare City of Boston v. Allen, 91 F. 248, 252-53 (1st Cir. 1898) (limiting award to
nominal damages based on Coupe, and asserting that Coupe may'have limited Suffolk), City
of Seattle v. McNamara, 81 F. 863, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1897) (same), and Houston, E. & W.T.
Ry. Co. v. Stern, 74 F. 636, 639-40 (5th Cir. 1896) (same), with U.S. Frumentum Co. v.
Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 624-25 (6th Cir. 1914) (awarding reasonable royalty despite Coupe),
McCune v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 154 F. 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1907) (same), and Cassidy v.
Hunt, 75 F. 1012, 1016-17 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (same).
76 See 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (rejecting an interpretation of Coupe as prohibiting
awards of reasonable royalties because, in Coupe, "although the plaintiff was entitled to
prove what would have been a reasonable royalty, and thereby show a proper basis for an
assessment of damages, no proof upon that subject was presented").
77 Id. at 643.
78 Id. at 647-48.
79 Id. at 650-51.
80 Id. at 648.
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reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its
utility and advantages, and the extent of the use involved."8'
By avoiding awards of nominal damages, courts moved away
from undercompensation associated with mere recognition of
violations of legal rights. That is, awards of nominal damages
simply recognize the existence of a legal right and its violation;
they do not attempt to provide compensation based on any
exogenous guideline other than liability, such as to compensate for
actual or assumed harm.8 2 For example, awards of nominal
damages do not relate in any way to the value of the underlying
patented technology.
When courts dispensed with awarding nominal damages and
instead began awarding reasonable royalties, they adopted a
guideline for awarding additional compensation consistent with
judges' sense of justice.8 3 And the guideline that courts adopted
focused on the value of patent rights based on the tort law
principle of making the patent owner whole. In particular, courts
sought to identify what royalty the patent owner and infringer
would have agreed upon had the infringer licensed the patent from
the patent owner instead of infringing.8 4 This analysis would
81 Id. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's description of the relevant inquiry: "In
the absence of [an established] royalty, and in the absence of proof of lost sales or injury by
competition, the only measure of damages was such sum as, under all the circumstances,
would have been a reasonable royalty for the defendant to have paid." Id. at 649 (quoting
Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894)).
82 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 8 (2013).
83 See, e.g., U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617-18 (6th Cir. 1914) ('To send
the successful plaintiff away after years of litigation and with only nominal damages is
repellent to the sense of justice.").
84 See, e.g., McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 425 (1878) (employing this
hypothetical agreement analysis). Ted Sichelman has described this "premise of promoting
the status quo ante"-the idea that a patent owner should be returned to the status it held
prior to infringement by, for example, awarding it the royalty it would have received had
the infringer paid to license the patented technology rather than engage in unlicensed use-
"as a fundamental tenet of patent law remedies" that "should be jettisoned." Sichelman,
supra note 21, at 554. He would jettison it, in part, because "the level of damages that
promotes optimal innovation incentives ... may often be less, and sometimes more, than
the profits or royalties that would have been earned in the marketplace but for the
infringement." Id. But, in Sichelman's view, today reasonable royalties may not be used to
provide optimal incentives to invent, but instead must reflect tort law make-whole
principles, given the statutory codification of reasonable royalties. Id. at 560 ("Because the
current patent-remedies scheme contemplates making the patentee whole in the event of
infringement, attempts to deviate from that baseline... would contravene legislative
authority.").
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necessarily include an assessment of the value of the patented
technology, but the focus would be on the ability of the patent
owner to extract from the infringer any value based on the
existence of the patent rights had the two parties negotiated in
advance of infringement.8 5 Given that any such negotiation would
include discounts based on the likelihood of liability, relief, and
enforceability, and increases based on the value of injunctive relief
and, at least potentially, the costs to negotiate and litigate, the
determination of reasonable royalties would reflect the value of the
patent owner's patent rights. But awards reflecting the value of
patent rights provided more justice compared to awards of nominal
damages. And, again, the value of patent rights at least includes
as one factor the value of the underlying patented technology.
Thus, the movement from nominal damages to reasonable
royalties represented a first step toward valuing patented
technology.
B. COURTS' RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS WITH ESTABLISHED ROYALTIES
Courts also began to use reasonable royalties to avoid awards of
established royalties in cases where there was widespread belief in
the invalidity of the licensed patent. Courts did so in a series of
cases involving a patent owned by Consolidated Rubber Tire
Company.
In 1915, Judge Learned Hand authored one of the seminal
opinions on point, just months after the Supreme Court's decision
in Dowagiac "settl[ed] the mooted question as to whether a
reasonable royalty may be allowed."8 6 The patent-in-suit had been
declared invalid by the Sixth Circuit in 1902, not invalid by the
Seventh Circuit in 1907, and finally not invalid by the Supreme
Court in 1911.87 When the patent owner later asked for an award
85 See, e.g., McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 425 (finding the value of the patent rights to be what
the infringers reasonably would pay and the plaintiff would accept if the parties had
negotiated prior to infringement).
86 Consol. Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co. of N.Y., 226 F. 455, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1915), aff-d, 232 F. 475 (2d Cir. 1916).
87 See id. at 463-64 (describing the trial history of the patent). One opinion explains that
seventeen courts passed on the validity of the patent at issue. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Consol.
Rubber Tire Co., 251 F. 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1918). The cases predated (and no doubt
highlight a benefit of) the Supreme Court's recognition of non-mutual defensive collateral
estoppel in patent cases; now a final, unappealable judgment of invalidity in one lawsuit
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of damages for the patent's infringement, Judge Hand rejected the
idea of limiting the patent owner to a royalty established after the
Sixth Circuit declared the patent invalid and prior to the Supreme
Court's resolution of the patent's validity in 1911:
[T]he decision invalidating the patent on May 6,
1902[] ma[de] impossible any true established royalty
thereafter. All the subsequent period until the patent
was finally declared valid in April, 1911, seems to me
irrelevant to any just estimate of the patentee's
damages. Even if, crippled as the patent was by the
adverse ruling, an apparent established royalty during
that period had been shown, I should not regard it as a
true established royalty, because that phrase should
not be used of the value of a patent monopoly which is
suspected with good reason of being no patent at
all .... [W]e must seek a reasonable royalty .... 88
Thus, Judge Hand rejected as unjust an award of a royalty
established during a time when there was a common suspicion
that the patent was invalid. And instead of awarding an
established royalty, Judge Hand resorted to awarding a reasonable
royalty.8 9
Judge Hand's decision to reject royalties established during the
time period when a patent was thought to be invalid pushed the
law governing reasonable royalties in the direction of valuing only
patented technology. Indeed, one might read his decision rejecting
a royalty established during a time period when a patent was
thought to be invalid as laying the groundwork for this conception
of reasonable royalties. In effect, he distinguished between
benefits all potential infringers. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (holding that non-mutual defensive collateral estoppel may be raised
as defense to a patent infringement claim).
88 Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 226 F. at 458.
89 Id. Judge Arthur Sanborn, finding the same reasonable royalty in a separate lawsuit
involving the same patent, described "widespread infringement following' the 1902 decision
that "compelled plaintiffs to lower royalties." Consol. Rubber Tire Co. v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
237 F. 893, 893-94 (N.D. Ill. 1916), modified and affd, 251 F. 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1918)
(adding an award of interest on damages). Another opinion indicates that the amount of
money paid to license the patent dropped from twenty cents to two cents after a court found
the patent invalid. B.F. Goodrich Co., 251 F. at 620.
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established royalties and reasonable royalties based on the
difference between valuing patent rights (which by its nature
depends on the validity of the underlying patent) and valuation
focusing exclusively on the value of the patented technology (which
does not depend on the validity of the underlying patent). And he
rejected valuation based on patent rights. In particular, he
rejected the concept of discounting the monetary award based on
assessments of the likelihood of liability. While discounting
occurred in the market because of a common belief that the patent
was likely invalid and that, therefore, a court likely would not
provide any remedy, there is no indication of changing views in the
market regarding the value of the underlying patented technology.
In short, Judge Hand's rejection of the established royalty
effectively adopted the value of the underlying patented
technology as the appropriate focus of a reasonable royalty
calculation. 90
In an unbroken line of succession, later courts have followed
Judge Hand's reasoning by awarding reasonable royalties rather
than diminished royalties established during periods of "disrepute"
and "open defiance" of patents-but they have also extended his
reasoning to set a requirement that any assessment of a
reasonable royalty be based upon an assumption that the patent at
issue was valid and would be respected. 91 Indeed, the so-called
90 Conceptually, one might argue that Judge Hand's rejection of the royalty set by the
market reflected a concern with valuing the actual patent right (the later-determined, valid
right), rather than a false understanding of that right (the false belief that the patent was
invalid). But, as I have described it, the concept of valuing patent rights is closely tied to
measuring the probability of liability, relief, and enforceability. See supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text. Moreover, Judge Hand made no reference to rewarding the patent
owner for the ability to impose negotiation or litigation costs on the infringer. Regardless,
the underlying point remains: by eliminating discounting due to the possibility of invalidity,
Judge Hand removed from the analysis the value of the ability to convince a court to grant a
remedy for infringement. He therefore tied the reasonable royalty calculation more tightly
to the value of the patented technology than to other exogenous factors.
91 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Blackmore, 53 F.2d 725, 729 (6th Cir. 1931) (noting "the
hypothesis that the patent was valid and would be respected" (citing Consol. Rubber Tire
Co., 226 F. at 455)); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1937) (same)
(citing Blackmore, 53 F.2d at 725); Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
1577 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[A] court should not select a diminished royalty rate a patentee
may have been forced to accept by the disrepute of his patent and the open defiance of his
rights." (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing Dailey, 93 F.2d at 941-42));
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[T]his court has long
recognized that a reasonable royalty can be different than a given royalty when, for
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"assumption of validity" used in reasonable royalty determinations
can be traced to Judge Hand's decision, and it has the effect of
tying reasonable royalties more closely to the value of patented
technology. 92
C. COURTS HAVE NOT CLEARLY EXPLAINED THE DISTINCTION
Despite the progression of the law toward valuing patented
technology and away from valuing patent rights, courts have not
clearly explained, let alone embraced, the distinction between
these two conceptions of reasonable royalties. Here, I will first
consider opinions from the Federal Circuit, given its unique role in
describing the law governing patent law in this country based
upon its exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent infringement
cases, and then consider opinions from the Supreme Court.
1. The Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has not directly
confronted the distinction between valuing patent rights and
valuing only patented technology. And while it has explained the
law governing reasonable royalties in a way that focuses attention
on valuing patented technology, it has done so in the context of a
example, widespread infringement artificially depressed past licenses." (citing Fromson, 853
F.2d at 1577)). For additional authority, see generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that "the entirely of the circumstances
should be considered," including "what effect infringement has had on the value of a
patent"), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1183, 1183 (1997); Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol
Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[A] higher figure may be awarded when the
evidence clearly shows that widespread infringement made the established royalty
artificially low." (citation omitted)); Trio Process. Corp. v. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d
126, 129 (3d Cir. 1976) (reasoning that a reasonable royalty may be higher than an
artificially-depressed royalty).
92 I do not mean to overstate the point. In modern times it is relatively rare for courts to
award established royalties. See Chapman, supra note 5, at 323 ("[E]stablished royalties
are relatively rare, because courts have established stringent and narrowly defined
requirements that must be met before an observed royalty rate may be considered
'established.' "); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(identifying requirements for awarding an established royalty). Instead, courts award
reasonable royalties. Chapman, supra note 5, at 323-24. This shift away from established
royalties and toward reasonable royalties does not necessarily reflect Judge Hand's
discomfort with awarding a heavily-discounted, established royalty, but rather the
"stringent and narrowly defined requirements that must be met before an observed royalty
rate may be considered 'established.'" Id. at 323. But if a patent owner continues licensing
the use of its patented technology at the same royalty after a judgment of liability, rather
than increase that royalty, the royalty may be deemed established, and there is less basis to
argue that the royalty reflects a valuation discounted based on potential non-liability.
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framework that values patent rights. Consider two relatively
recent cases.
In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., the Federal
Circuit described valuing patented technology. 93  The court
remarked that "the hypothetical negotiation framework [for
determining reasonable royalties] ... seeks to discern the value of
the patented technology to the parties in the marketplace when
infringement began."94 Thus, the court effectively explained that
the purpose of a reasonable royalty analysis is to determine the
expected value of the patented technology. This remark, however,
was followed by a more complete description of the hypothetical
negotiation construct that is consistent with valuation of patent
rights.95 The court stated that "the basic question posed in a
hypothetical negotiation is: if, on the eve of infringement, a willing
licensor and licensee had entered into an agreement instead of
allowing infringement of the patent to take place, what would that
agreement be?"96 The reality is that this agreement would reflect,
at least in part, the parties' assessment of the likelihood of
liability, relief, and enforceability-the value of the patent owner's
patent rights.97 The court did not discuss the difference between
valuation of patent rights and valuation of only patented
technology, nor did it clearly select one approach to valuation over
the other. The remark concerning valuing patented technology
may merely reflect the fact that valuation of patent rights
necessarily includes valuation of patented technology-even
though the focus is on the ability of patent owners to extract value
from accused infringers based on the threat of obtaining monetary
and equitable remedies and imposing negotiation and litigation
costs.
Likewise, in ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the Federal
Circuit stated that, "[a]t all times, the damages inquiry must
concentrate on compensation for the economic harm caused by
infringement of the claimed invention."98 The court went on to




97 See supra Part II.A (reviewing that valuation).
98 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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explain that, as a result, "the trial court must carefully tie proof of
damages to the claimed invention's footprint in the market
place."99 It criticized the district court for allowing the patent
owner to "inflate the reasonable royalty analysis with conveniently
selected licenses without an economic or other link to the
technology in question."100 The court also instructed the district
court to focus on prior license agreements "linked to the economic
demand for the claimed technology." 10 1  While this analysis
highlights that a proper valuation includes an appraisal of the
patented technology, it does not clearly exclude valuation of patent
rights. Moreover, the court's recognition of the hypothetical
negotiation construct in the same opinion again allows for some
distortion based on valuation of patent rights.0 2  The court,
however, did recognize aspects of the law seeking to correct for two
such distortions: (1) distortion caused by the fact that "litigation
itself can skew the results of the hypothetical negotiation" 10 3 and
(2) distortion caused by the possibility that "widespread
infringement artificially depressed past licenses."'1 4  The first
distortion relates to the cost of litigation, to its inherent riskiness
for both patent owners and alleged infringers, and to risk aversion.
The second distortion may be understood to raise a concern similar
to Judge Hand's concern with undercompensation based on
incorrect predictions of non-liability: misplaced estimations of
liability may produce downward pressure on negotiated royalties.
Thus, while not explicitly recognizing the distinction between
valuation of patent rights and valuation of patented technology,
this decision frames the reasonable royalty inquiry as an economic
analysis related to the value of the claimed technology.10 5
Moreover, it recognizes specific restrictions on the hypothetical
99 Id.
100 Id. at 872.
101 Id. at 872-73.
102 Id. at 872.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 869, 872-73 (suggesting that the trial court on remand look to the "economic
demand for the claimed technology").
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negotiation construct that seek to direct its use to valuation of
patented technology only, rather than valuation of patent rights.10 6
2. The Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has come closer to
distinguishing between valuation based on patent rights and
valuation based only on patented technology. 10 7 Consider one of
the Court's more recent opinions, and then two of the Court's older
opinions.
First, consider the more recent case. In eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., decided in 2006, the Supreme Court
remarked that "the creation of a right is distinct from the
provision of remedies for violations of that right."108 In the context
of its decision, the Court was referring to the statutory "right to
exclude" and the statutory authorization for courts to grant the
remedy of injunctive relief for its violation.10 9 Thus, in context, the
statement meant that the right to exclude is distinct from the
provision of injunctive relief for violation of that right; the
statutory grant to a patent owner of a right to exclude does not
necessarily mean that a patent owner is entitled to an
injunction. 10 But the language the Court used more broadly
distinguished between any patent right and any remedies for
106 Id. at 872. One might argue that isolated statements in a few Federal Circuit opinions
support valuation of patent rights. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,
949 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[The award of damages compensates for the violation of the
patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.");
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403, 1406 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("In patent law, the fact of infringement establishes the fact of damage because
the patentee's right to exclude has been violated."). But in context these statements do not
address, let alone exclude, the idea of using reasonable royalties to value patented
technology rather than patent rights.
107 Recent scholarship by two economists, John Jarosz and Michael Chapman, refers
briefly to a question at the heart of the subject of this Article: "[W]hether and to what extent
the patent holder's reasonable royalty damages should include not only compensation for
the specific contribution of the patented invention, but also for the violation of the patent
holder's right to exclude others from practicing the patent." Jarosz & Chapman, supra note
5, at 798. They highlight that the Supreme Court's eBay decision provides reason to believe
that the Court might distinguish between valuation based on patent rights and valuation
based only on patented technology. Id. at 799. Jarosz and Chapman ultimately conclude
that "[i]t is not clear that any damages should be awarded to compensate for the patent
holder's loss of the ability to exclude others from using the patented invention." Id.
108 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
109 Id.
110 Id. Quoting the Patent Act, the Court reasoned "that injunctive relief 'may' issue only
'in accordance with the principles of equality.'" Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012)).
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violation of the right.111 And so a similar distinction can be made
between patent rights generally and the provision of monetary
relief in the form of reasonable royalties: the existence of patent
rights is distinct from the provision of reasonable royalties for
violations of those rights. In other words, reasonable royalties
need not equal the value of patent rights; they are separate
concepts. And as I have discussed, reasonable royalties may
reflect only the value of patented technology. 112 In eBay, however,
the Court did not describe the difference between valuation of
patent rights and valuation only of patented technology. In older
cases-much older cases-the Court came closer to making this
distinction explicit.
Now consider the two older cases, both of which predate the
Supreme Court's sanctioning of awards of reasonable royalties in
Dowagiac in 1915. The first is Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, decided in
1865.113 The Supreme Court's opinion in the case-a seminal one
on the issue of reasonable royalties (then called general
damages)-may be interpreted as distinguishing between
valuation of patent rights and valuation of patented technology.11 4
The Court explained that a trial court did not err by instructing a
jury to estimate actual damages by measuring the "value of
improvements" identified in the patent-in-suit:
[L]ooking at the term value, in the connection in which
it was used [in the jury instruction], it is quite clear
that it had reference only to the utility and
advantages, or value of the use of the improvement
over the old mode of cleaning cotton; not the value of
the patent itself.115
In this short explanation, the Court indicated that the correct
value for a reasonable royalty analysis is the value of the patented
improvement rather than the value of the complete technology
described in the patent; the value of the use of the improvement
111 See id.
112 See supra Part II.B.
113 70 U.S. 315 (1865).
114 Id. at 319-20.
115 Id.
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rather than the value of the improvement itself; and the value of
the patented improvement rather than the value of the patent
itself.116 In this last respect-the point that the relevant value is
that of the patented improvement rather than that of the patent
itself-the Court, on the one hand, used terminology
distinguishing between valuation of patented technology and
valuation of patent rights. The "value of the patent itself' is, after
all, the present value of all of the rights the patent provides
against all existing and potential infringers. In the context of the
decision, on the other hand, the Court may have been using
"patent" rather erroneously as shorthand for "patented invention."
Indeed, it may have done so in order to emphasize the distinction
between the value of use of the improvement over prior technology,
as compared to the value of use of the complete technology
described in the patent regardless of the state of prior technology.
And if this latter interpretation is correct, then the case stands
only for the proposition that reasonable royalties should reflect
incremental profit from use of patented technology.
117
The second case is Rude v. Wescott, decided in 1889.118 In its
decision, the Supreme Court again focused on the value of
technology and at least implicitly distinguished the valuation of
patent rights.1 9  Like the Federal Circuit's decision in
116 Id.; see also id. at 320 ("This question of damages, under the rule given in the statute,
is always attended with difficulty and embarrassment both to the court and jury. There
being no established patent or license fee in the case, in order to get at a fair measure of
damages, or even an approximation to it, general evidence must necessarily be resorted to.
And what evidence could be more appropriate and pertinent than that of the utility and
advantage of the invention over the old modes or devices that had been used for working out
similar results? With a knowledge of these benefits to the persons who have used the
invention, and the extent of the use by the infringer, a jury will be in possession of material
and controlling facts that may enable them, in the exercise of a sound judgment, to
ascertain the damages, or, in other words, the loss to the patentee or owner, by the piracy,
instead of the purchase of the use of the invention.").
117 See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 47-48, 215 (2005) (discussing the concept of
incremental profit). Other cases highlight the same distinction made in Suffolk. See, e.g.,
Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438, 440-41 (6th Cir. 1928) ("[The
patent owner] cannot, by the language which his claim happens to take, transform his
invention of an improvement in an existing structure into one of a complete structure, as if
it were wholly new, so as to entitle him to profits upon these parts of it which are not in any
fair sense his invention.").
118 130 U.S. 152 (1889).
119 Id. at 164.
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ResQNet.com, the Supreme Court highlighted the distortion of
litigation-induced settlement agreements on a proper damages
analysis,120 and in the process twice indicated that the proper
damages analysis seeks to identify "the value of the improvements
patented."121 First, the Court stated that "a payment of any sum
in settlement of a claim for an alleged infringement cannot be
taken as a standard to measure the value of the improvements
patented, in determining the damages sustained by the owners of
the patent in other cases of infringement."'' 22 Then, in explaining
why this is so, the Court explained that "[m]any considerations
other than the value of the improvements patented may induce the
payment in such cases," including "[t]he avoidance of the risk and
expense of litigation.'' 23  What the Court condemned-valuing
avoidance of risk and expense of litigation-is exactly consistent
with my definition of valuing patent rights. 124 The Court went on
to indicate that appropriate evidence of damages for patent
infringement would include "evidence of the value of the invention
to the defendants,"'125 which is one way to value patented
technology. 126 Despite this discussion distinguishing valuation of
technology from valuation of patent rights, the Court held that the
patent owner's evidence related to the value of the technology was
only conjectural, "furnish[ing] no satisfactory basis for any
120 Id. This analysis resembles the Federal Circuit's analysis in ResQNet.com. See supra
notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
121 Rude, 130 U.S. at 164.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Id. (emphasis added).
124 See supra Part II.B (defining valuation of patent rights as "reflect[ing] the value the
patent owner and the accused infringer place on the remedies a court might provide in a
dispute over patent infringement, as well as associated negotiation costs, litigation costs,
and risk aversion").
125 Rude, 130 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added) ("[N]o evidence of the value of the invention to
the defendants was adduced except the conjectural estimates stated; and they furnished no
satisfactory basis for any damages, much less data which authorized the specific finding
made as to the damages for each drill used. Opinions not founded on knowledge were of no
value. Conclusions from such opinions were at best mere guesses. By the decision rendered
a settled rule of law was violated, that actual, not speculative, damages must be shown, and
by clear and definite proof, to warrant a recovery for the infringement of a patent.").
126 See supra Part IL.B (defining valuation of patented technology).
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damages," and therefore the Court remanded the case with
instructions for the lower court to award nominal damages. 1
27
Thus, both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have
issued opinions that at least implicitly distinguish the valuation of
patent rights in favor of valuing patented technology,
ResQNet.com and Rude. Neither court, however, has expressly
articulated the distinction between valuing patent rights and
valuing patented technology, let alone explored how the distinction
comports with the public policies guiding the reasonable royalty
analysis, how it can be used as a touchstone to guide reform of the
law governing reasonable royalties, and the benefits that would
accompany these reforms. I turn to these matters next.
IV. GUIDING PUBLIC POLICIES
While courts have not clearly expressed the distinction between
valuation of patent rights and valuation of patented technology,
they and modern commentators have clearly expressed the public
policies guiding the award of reasonable royalties in patent cases.
Beyond the basic tort law principle of putting the patent owner in
the economic position it would have been in had there been no
infringement, 128 I will show that these public policies include
preventing injustice associated with undercompensation,
eliminating an incentive to infringe and litigate in favor of an
incentive to settle and license, and providing incentives to invent.
Significantly, adoption of the principle of valuing patented
technology would further each of these other public policies. 129
127 Rude, 130 U.S. at 167. It would be another twenty-six years before the Court, in
Dowagiac, would sanction awards of reasonable royalties to avoid nominal damages. See
supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)
(plurality opinion) ("[To determine the damages that may be recovered from [the infringer]
here, we must ask how much [the patent owner] suffered by [the infringer's] infringement-
how much it would have made if [the infringer] had not infringed.").
129 The question of whether reasonable royalties should value patent rights or instead
only patented technology is a matter of determining the appropriate paradigm. Some might
view the resolution of the question as a matter of politics or economics. I begin to analyze
this question by studying significant decisions in the common law governing the award of
reasonable royalties and the articulated policy justifications. As I will show, these decisions
in certain respects have moved the doctrine toward valuing only patented technology. I
then consider an economic analysis of the doctrine, which also provides justification for
adopting valuation only of patented technology. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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A. PREVENTING INJUSTICE ASSOCIATED WITH UNDERCOMPENSATION
As shown, judges originally developed the concept of reasonable
royalties to avoid injustice. 130 They sought to provide more than
mere nominal damages to patent owners who, despite proving
infringement and lack of invalidity, were unable to prove
entitlement to actual damages-either lost profits or lost
royalties-or disgorgement of infringers' profits.131  Similarly,
these judges sought to avoid awarding royalties negotiated during
times when particular patents were believed to be invalid because
those negotiated royalties would incorporate substantial discounts
compared to royalties negotiated during times when the patents
were not believed to be invalid. 132 Representative of these early
views, Judge Hand explained: "The whole notion of a reasonable
royalty is a device in aid of justice, by which that which is really
incalculable shall be approximated, rather than that the patentee,
who has suffered an indubitable wrong, shall be dismissed with
empty hands."' 33 Thus, to avoid injustice, reasonable royalties to
some degree reflect estimations of actual harm. In this sense,
some reasonable royalties reflect estimated lost profits when
actual lost profits cannot be proved with the requisite evidentiary
proof; other reasonable royalties reflect estimated lost royalties.1 34
Awarding reasonable royalties based on the value of the
underlying patented technology rather than the value of patent
rights likewise avoids injustice by eliminating discounting.
130 See supra Part III.A-B.
131 See, e.g., U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 616-18 (6th Cir. 1914)
(discussing the basis for awards of reasonable royalties in these circumstances); Suffolk Co.
v. Hayden, 70 U.S. 315, 320 (1865) (same).
132 See, e.g., Consol. Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co. of N.Y., 226 F. 455, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (discussing the need for a reasonable royalty after concluding that money
paid when the patent was believed to be invalid did not represent "a true established
royalty").
133 Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933).
134 Cf. Lemley, supra note 6, at 669-73 (criticizing use of reasonable royalties to estimate
lost profits and advocating for a loosening of the stringent evidentiary requirements
preventing patent owners who practice their own inventions from obtaining lost profits).
When patent owners provide the requisite evidentiary proof that they would have made
some but not all of the infringer's sales, courts split awards between lost profits that
compensate for lost sales and reasonable royalties that compensate for lost royalties. See
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that a
damages award in a patent case "may be split between lost profits as actual damages to the
extent they are proven and a reasonable royalty for the remainder").
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Beyond avoiding undercompensation associated with nominal
damages, it also avoids awarding royalties established during
periods of suspected invalidity of patents. Indeed, focusing on the
value of the patented technology would eliminate
undercompensation associated with valuation based on all risks
associated with liability, relief, and enforcement; costs of
negotiation and litigation; and related risk aversion.
B. ELIMINATING INCENTIVES TO INFRINGE AND LITIGATE
Judge Howard Markey 135 later identified a specific reason-
beyond the general concept of injustice associated with
undercompensation-to award reasonable royalties, and
specifically reasonable royalties exceeding negotiated royalties in
magnitude: elimination of an otherwise existing incentive to
infringe and litigate. 13 6 In particular, Judge Markey highlighted
that the prospect of a remedy equal to a negotiated royalty may
give a potential licensee reason to decline licensing a patent and
instead challenge the patent's validity, enforceability, and
infringement in court.1 37 He thus identified what may be called a
problem with holdout by potential licensees. In Judge Markey's
words:
Except for the limited risk that the patent owner, over
years of litigation, might meet the heavy
burden.., for recovery of lost profits, the [potential
licensee] would have nothing to lose, and everything to
gain if he could count on paying only the normal,
routine royalty non-infringers might have paid.13
If the potential licensee won, for example, it would owe the patent
owner nothing. More significantly, however, even if it lost, it
'35 Judge Markey would become the first Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the court given virtually exclusive jurisdiction starting in 1982 over
appeals in patent cases. At the time he drafted the opinion in question, Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978), however, he was a judge on
the Court of Patent Appeals and Interferences and sat by designation in the Sixth Circuit.
Id. at 1154.
136 Id. at 1158.
137 Id. at 1158-59.
138 Id. at 1158.
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would owe the patent owner only the negotiated royalty-the same
royalty that it would have paid for a license. 139 Thus, Judge
Markey concluded that determination of a reasonable royalty-
after the potential licensee's election of using the invention, and
taking the risk that litigation will ensue and that the patent will
be found valid and infringed-"cannot, without injustice," be
treated as though the potential licensee had elected to negotiate a
license and pay a negotiated royalty in the first place. 140 To do so
would encourage infringement and costly litigation rather than
respect for patent rights and efficiencies associated with
settlement of disputes and licensing. 141 And it would
systematically result in undercompensation of patent owners. 142
Judge Markey thus favored the elimination of an incentive to
infringe and litigate by requiring infringers to pay full
compensation for infringement to patent owners rather than
discounted amounts.143
Judge Markey's concern with the use of negotiated royalties as
reasonable royalties highlights a significant problem associated
with valuation of patent rights and a significant benefit associated
with valuation of patented technology. As discussed above,
negotiated royalties reflect the value of patent rights. 144
189 See id. (stating that "the [potential licensee] would be in a 'heads-I-win, tails.you-lose'
position"). The potential licensee in actuality would be in a "heads-I-win, tails-I-break-
even" position. Neither characterization, however, takes into account attorneys' fees and
costs.
140 Id. at 1159.
14, Id. This theory is subject to criticism based on empirical data indicating that most
infringers do not make a decision to infringe; most do not have knowledge of the relevant
patents at the time they begin using patented technology or engage in copying of patented
technology. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1462-65 (2009).
142 While Judge Markey did not expressly identify undercompensation, it is a basic point
of his argument. Relatedly, he also did not expressly identify what standard should govern
an accurate determination of a reasonable royalty. Regardless, whatever standard is used
to determine reasonable royalties, negotiated royalties will discount reasonable royalties
based on the risks of litigation. Thus, what Judge Markey highlighted is the potential
problem of circularity in reasonable royalty determinations and resulting
undercompensation based on discounting for risk.
143 The elimination of the incentive to infringe and litigate is not really deterrence.
Punitive damages deter. The elimination of the incentive to infringe and litigate by causing
infringers to internalize risk is not the creation of a disincentive to infringe and litigate; it
merely makes the two options equal in economic impact to the decisionmaker-actor.
144 See supra Part II.A.
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Negotiated royalties thus include discounts based on risk borne by
the patent owner associated with proving liability, relief, and
enforceability, and they may also include discounts based on costs
borne by the patent owner to bring infringement litigation. 4 Use
of negotiated royalties as reasonable royalties locks in these
discounts, creates incentives to infringe and litigate instead of
settle and license, and, moreover, creates a circularity problem.
To understand the circularity problem associated with using
negotiated royalties as reasonable royalties, assume that a court
awards a patent owner a first reasonable royalty without the
benefit of any prior negotiated royalties; parties negotiate royalties
equal to an average of prior reasonable royalties but with
discounts based on the patent owners' risks; and courts award
subsequent reasonable royalties equal to an average of prior
negotiated royalties. Further assume that the first reasonable
royalty is $1,000,000 and that the discounts always equal 50%.146
In this scenario: (1) the court sets the first reasonable royalty at
$1,000,000; (2) the patent owner and one potential infringer
negotiate a first negotiated royalty equal to the first reasonable
royalty but with a first set of discounts based on the patent
owner's risks, resulting in a first negotiated royalty of $500,000;
(3) a second court sets a second reasonable royalty equal to the
first negotiated royalty, resulting in a second reasonable royalty of
$500,000; (4) the patent owner and another potential infringer
negotiate a second negotiated royalty equal to an average of the
first and second reasonable royalties, but include a second set of
discounts based on the patent owner's risks, resulting in a second
negotiated royalty of $375,000; (5) a third court sets a third
reasonable royalty equal to an average of the first and second
145 See supra Part II.A.
146 The question of the appropriate level of reasonable royalties and the circularity
problem persist, of course, only if the patent owner succeeds in each infringement case. If it
does succeed, however, then the risk to the patent owner may be less with each subsequent
lawsuit. This makes sense regarding, for example, invalidity challenges if each subsequent
infringer uses the same arguments that failed in previous lawsuits. But potential
infringers may also learn from failed strategies and try new ones. Furthermore, success in
litigation may embolden patent owners to try to extend the scope of their patents to capture
additional infringers, creating more risk of invalidity or non-infringement. Thus, for this
simple model, I use one discount factor rather than multiple discount factors. Note,
however, that the circularity problem continues to exist even if the discount factor reduces
with each subsequent lawsuit, so long as it remains positive.
2014]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
negotiated royalties, resulting in a third reasonable royalty of
$437,500; (6) the patent owner and yet another potential infringer
negotiate a third negotiated royalty equal to an average of the
first, second, and third reasonable royalties, but include a third set
of discounts based on the patent owner's risks, resulting in a third
negotiated royalty of $322,916.67; (7) and so on and so on.147
This circularity problem 148 is a direct result of valuing patent
rights. The assumption of validity, applied correctly, counteracts
parties' agreed discounting based on the risk of invalidity. This
doctrine therefore helps to eliminate some, but not all of the
inherent circularity given all of the risk associated with liability,
relief, and enforcement, as well as differential costs borne by
parties to patent litigation. I will return to the problem of
circularity, 149 but for now I want to highlight that valuation of
patented technology does not include any discounts associated
with the risk of liability, relief, or enforcement. Nor does it include
any discounts associated with disproportionate costs of patent
litigation.
C. PROVIDING OPTIMAL INCENTIVES TO INVENT
Modern commentators identify a different public policy to
support awards of reasonable royalties. They focus on providing
147 Even if this simple model is changed to allow courts to include prior reasonable
royalties in their averaging, a similar, but protracted, downward spiral results.
148 Others have dubbed the effect of this circularity as "double-discounting." Cotter, Four
Principles, supra note 6, at 752-53 (summarizing double-discounting); BLAIR & COTTER,
supra note 117, at 230 (same); Stephen H. Kalos & Jonathan D. Putnam, On the
Incomparability of 'Comparables"- An Economic Interpretation of 'Infringer's Royalties,' 9 J.
PROPRIETARY RTs. 4, 4 (1997) ("In essence, if actual arm's length royalties are awarded as
damages there is a double counting of the discount for uncertainty."). Despite this label, the
discounting is not necessarily limited to a double discount. Indeed, applying game theory to
this simple scenario, where the number of determinations of reasonable royalties and
negotiated royalties is infinite and there are no independent factors constraining either
reasonable royalties or negotiated royalties, the negotiated royalties and reasonable
royalties both approach zero. Cf. Golden, "Patent Trolls," supra note 6, at 2135 n.80
(making a similar point based on discounts associated with the patent holder's bargaining
skill). If there is a factor that is independent of liability, then the reasonable royalty will
converge on it rather than zero. If a patent owner can impose costs on a potential infringer
that exceed its own costs, for example, then the negotiated and reasonable royalties may
converge on the difference in costs. Examples of relevant costs include both direct
expenditures and opportunity costs, such as the time relevant employees spend on patent
infringement litigation rather than productive endeavors.
149 See infra Part VI.A.
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optimal incentives to invent.150 This conception of reasonable
royalties favors awarding the appropriate amount of money to
patent owners (a) to spur investment in breakthrough inventions
by prospective patent applicants, and (b) to spur investment in
improvements by prospective users of patented technology.
151
Moreover, legal scholars have made the case that reasonable
royalties should provide just enough incentive for prospective
patent owners to invent, but no more. 152
A recurring theme of these economic theories is that a
reasonable royalty should be calculated by identifying the
incremental profit of the patented technology, 153 or, in other words,
the difference between the net value of the patented technology
and the net value of the next-best non-infringing alternative to the
patented technology. 154 While this calculation is not possible in
every circumstance and whether the patent owner should be
entitled to all of this difference is, at a minimum, debatable,
55
150 See, e.g., Bailey et al., supra note 5, at 271 (offering an approach seeking to "align
damages awards with incentives to innovate"); Elhauge, supra note 5, at 536 (determining
that current royalties may be too low to incentivize optimal levels of invention); Kalos &
Putnam, supra note 148, at 5 (analyzing types of royalties that preserve the incentive to
engage in research and development); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 194 (expressing
concern about patent holdup's ability to "distort or... dampen innovation incentives");
Sichelman, supra note 21, at 571 ("[P]atent law remedies should be tailored to optimize
innovation incentives ... ").
151 See Landers, supra note 6, at 505 ("Achieving a workable patent system requires a
balance between preserving incentives for the initial inventor and minimizing the
detrimental impact to subsequent improvers. . . . The question of incentives must
encompass a concern for sequential invention in order to fully conform with the central
purpose of the patent system.").
152 See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 21, at 542 (describing the "fundamental goal of patent
law" as "to give as little protection as possible consistent with encouraging innovation")
(quoting Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1051 (2005)); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 279 (2007) ("We do not need . . . to internalize all the benefits of innovation-just
enough benefits to encourage the optimal level of innovation.").
153 See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 117, at 215 (discussing the concept of incremental
profit).
154 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12, at 22.
155 John Golden has explored these problems in some depth. Golden, Principles for Patent
Remedies, supra note 6, at 529-39. As just one example, he provides a "simple model of
patent racing show[ing] how divergence between public and private cost-benefit analyses
can mean that the optimal value of reward ... is less than an invention's total social value."
Id. at 531. Relatedly, below I highlight that one of the open questions related to full
adoption of a system of valuation focused exclusively on the value of patented technology is
whether inventors should obtain all of the value of their inventions. See infra Part V.c.5.
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inherent in this economic justification for reasonable royalties is
that it focuses on the value of the relevant patented technology
rather than the value of patent rights.
V. REFORMING THE LAW TO Focus ON VALUING PATENTED
TECHNOLOGY RATHER THAN PATENT RIGHTS
Modern courts have not perfectly focused reasonable royalties
on the value of patented technology rather than patent rights.
Indeed, there are ways the law governing reasonable royalties
would change if it did so. I explore those ways here, and also
consider some unresolved questions regarding a conception of
reasonable royalties that focuses exclusively on the value of
patented technology.
A. EXISTING METHODS OF CALCULATION
Before considering ways the law governing reasonable royalties
might change if it focused exclusively on valuing patented
technology, consider the three primary methodologies used by
courts to calculate reasonable royalties.
1. The Analytical Method. One available method to calculate
reasonable royalties is the so-called "analytical method."156  It
"focuses on the infringer's projections of profit for the infringing
product,"157 and involves "subtract[ing] the infringer's usual or
acceptable net profit from its anticipated net profit realized from
sales of infringing devices."158 The Federal Circuit, however, has
recognized that the hypothetical negotiation construct, discussed
in detail below, is more common than the analytical method in
determining reasonable royalties. 15 9 Thus, in this Article I focus
primarily on the hypothetical negotiation construct. I do highlight
here, however, that the analytical method, or a modified version of
it,160 may be a useful tool to value patented technology rather than
patent rights. In short, the difference between the infringer's
usual net profit and its anticipated net profit realized from use of
156 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
157 Id.
158 Id. (quoting TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
159 Id.
160 See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
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the patented technology may indicate one particular value of the
patented technology-the value to the infringer-without regard
for the value associated with the patent owner's right to seek
injunctive or monetary relief or impose costs through negotiation
or litigation.
2. The Georgia-Pacific Factors. Courts have stressed that
awards of reasonable royalties, by their very nature, require
flexibility with respect to the type of evidence juries are allowed to
consider given the impossibility of calculating precise awards in
the absence of specific evidence of actual damages. 161 Consistent
with this view, historically courts allowed juries to consider
various types of evidence to determine reasonable royalties,
including "the nature of the invention, its utility and advantages,
and the extent of the use involved,"162 "the profit made by the
defendant and that lost by the plaintiff,"163 and "the utility and
advantage of the invention over the old modes or devices that had
been used for working out similar results."' 64
Modern courts typically point to a list of fifteen factors-the
"Georgia-Pacific factors"-as representative of the various types of
evidence courts have found relevant to determinations of
reasonable royalties. 65 A district court drew these factors "from a
conspectus of the leading cases" and reported them in its decision
in a case brought by the Georgia-Pacific Corporation. 166 They are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the
licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to
prove an established royalty.
161 See, e.g., Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353, 363
(D. Del. 1960) ("A meticulous calculation of a fair or reasonable patent royalty is for all
practical purposes a physical impossibility. The field of economics-where a reasonable
royalty lies-is not subject to the uncanny precision of mathematical sciences such as
astronomy and electronics, since, unfortunately, business men do not at all times behave
like heavenly bodies or charged particles. To strive for such precision would serve only to
defeat the judicial purpose.").
162 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915).
163 Philp v. Nook, 84 U.S. 460, 462 (1873).
164 Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. 315, 320 (1865).
165 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
("This court has sanctioned the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the reasonable
royalty inquiry.").
166 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of
other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive
or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in
terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing
program to maintain his patent monopoly by not
licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve
that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the
licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are
competitors in the same territory in the same line of
business; or whether they are inventor and promotor.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in
promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the
existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the
extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the
license.
8. The established profitability of the product
made under the patent; its commercial success; and its
current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent
property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had
been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the
character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned
and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those
who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use
of the invention; and any evidence probative of the
value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price
that may be customary in the particular business or in
comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
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13. The portion of the realizable profit that should
be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements
added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the
patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would
have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began)
if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to
reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a
prudent licensee-who desired, as a business
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell
a particular article embodying the patented
invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty
and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which
amount would have been acceptable by a prudent
patentee who was willing to grant a license.16 7
The Federal Circuit has held that these factors do not represent a
test for royalty calculations, but instead serve "only as a list of
admissible factors informing a reliable economic analysis." 168
Note that some of these factors, including numbers 1 (any
established royalty), 2 (comparable royalties), 5 (the commercial
relationship between the licensor and licensee), and 6 (the value of
the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-
patented items), seem to focus on the value of patent rights. Other
factors, however, focus on the value of the patented technology.
These include numbers 8 (the established profitability of the
product made under the patent), 9 (the utility and advantages of
the patent property over the old modes or devices), 10 (any
benefits to those who have used the invention), 11 (evidence
probative of the value of the infringer's use of the invention), and
13 (the portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to
the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
167 Id.




manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer).
It is important to recognize that the last of the fifteen Georgia-
Pacific factors, the hypothetical negotiation construct, has, to a
large degree, superseded the remainder of the factors in terms of
importance. 169 Thus, I turn to its use next.
3. Hypothetical Negotiation Construct. The hypothetical
negotiation "attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement just before infringement began."'170 To do so, it "tries,
as best as possible, to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation
scenario and to describe the resulting agreement."'171 Indeed, "as a
legal construct, we seek to pin down how the prospective
infringement might have been avoided via an out-of-court business
solution."172 According to the Federal Circuit, the purpose of the
hypothetical negotiation construct is "to discern the value of the
patented technology to the parties in the marketplace when
infringement began."1 73  This articulated purpose is consistent
with the idea of determining the expected value of the patented
technology. But whether use of the hypothetical negotiation
construct actually achieves that purpose is questionable, as I will
show. 174
One of the primary benefits of the hypothetical negotiation
construct is that it provides a way for a jury to conceptualize the
legal question the court is asking it to decide. If a jury is able to
understand factors that would impact a negotiation over a license
to use technology, then it will be able to identify a reasonable
royalty. Courts, however, use assumptions that either reinforce a
natural understanding of this framework or undermine it. The
hypothetical negotiation construct, for example, includes some
assumptions that make it consistent with real licensing
169 See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 782 ('The most important, and lasting, impact
of Georgia-Pacific 1970 (and the Georgia-Pacific line of cases) has been the elevation of a
hypothetical negotiation construct as the primary tool for considering reasonable royalty
damages.").
170 Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
171 Id. at 1325.
172 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 76 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
173 Id.
174 See infra Part V.B.1.
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negotiations, but other assumptions and doctrines distinguish it
from real licensing negotiations. For example, on the one hand, at
least historically, one of the assumptions that made hypothetical
negotiations consistent with real negotiations was the assumption
that the licensee would seek to retain a reasonable profit.175
Recent decisions, however, have seemingly called this assumption
into question. 176
On the other hand, there are several assumptions that are
inconsistent with real licensing negotiations. One of these
assumptions, derived from Judge Hand's decision in Consolidated
Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co., 177 is that asserted patent
claims are valid. 178  Another assumption that makes the
175 See, e.g., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d
1403, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (rejecting an argument that a party would agree to pay a royalty
greater than its expected profit as "absurd"); Square Liner 360 ° , Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d
362, 377 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting an argument that a jury instruction must explicitly state
that "a reasonable royalty would leave an infringer with a reasonable profit" because this
concept was implicit in another jury instruction); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,
718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that it is implicit that a "reasonable royalty
would leave an infringer with a reasonable profit" (quoting Square Liner 360', 691 F.2d at
377)); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 299 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that when the trial court "did not allow [Georgia-Pacific] a reasonable
profit after paying the suppositious royalty" it made "a basic error which should be
corrected").
176 The Federal Circuit has indicated that the reasonable royalty determined by way of the
hypothetical negotiation need not leave the licensee with any actual residual profit. See
Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding
that "the district court clearly erred by ensuring the ongoing royalty rate it awarded would
'leave some room for profit' by [the infringer] at its current prices"); Mars, Inc. v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the notion that "a reasonable
royalty can never result in an infringer operating at a loss"); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("There is no rule that a royalty be no
higher than the infringer's net profit margin." (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus.,
Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989))); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he law does not require that an infringer be permitted to make a
profit."); State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1580 ("The determination of a reasonable royalty ... is
based not on the infringer's profit margin, but on what a willing licensor and licensee would
bargain for at hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement started."); Radio Steel &
Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (similar). Whether the
infringer actually would have earned a profit is a separate question from whether the
hypothetical licensee would have sought to earn a profit. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bro.
Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1978). Arguably, this distinction
reconciles the apparent conflict between the cases in this and the preceding footnote.
177 Consol. Rubber Tire Co. v. Diamond Rubber Co., 226 F. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). See
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
178 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Courts,
however, do not always make this assumption clear, particularly in the context of analyzing
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hypothetical negotiation construct different than real negotiations
is the assumption that the asserted claims are infringed. 179
The so-called "book of wisdom" doctrine similarly distinguishes
hypothetical negotiations from real negotiations. This doctrine
originated in the Supreme Court's opinion in 1933 in Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.'80 In it, Justice
Cardozo explained that evidence of increased efficiency or
decreased costs associated with actual use of a patented
technology may be used to determine a reasonable royalty, not just
earlier "uncertain prophesy" about the technology's value. 81 On
the one hand, soon after a patent issues, "the only evidence
available may be that supplied by testimony of experts as to the
state of the art, the character of the improvement, and the
probable increase of efficiency or saving of expense."18 2  On the
other hand, "if years have gone by before the evidence is offered,"
the Court explained, "[e]xperience is then available to correct
uncertain prophecy."'1 3  Commenting on the availability of this
evidence of experience, the Court stated: "Here is a book of wisdom
that courts may not neglect. We find no rule of law that sets a
clasp upon its pages, and forbids us to look within."'18 4
Justice Cardozo's metaphor provides a catchy shorthand (the
book of wisdom doctrine) for the admissibility of evidence of actual
increased efficiency or actual decreased costs, rather than limiting
the evidence related to the hypothetical negotiation to predictions
of these efficiencies or decreased costs. Stated otherwise, the
distinction the Court drew is between the actual value of patented
technology and the expected value of patented technology. 8 5 In
focusing attention on the actual value of patented technology, the
prior licenses to the patented technology. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comp.,
Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Actual licenses to the patented technology are highly
probative as to what constitutes a reasonable royalty for those patent rights because such
actual licenses most clearly reflect the economic value of the patented technology in the
marketplace.").
179 Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1325.
180 289 U.S. 689 (1933).




185 See id. at 699 ("Value for exchange is not the only value known to the law of damages.
There are times when heed must be given to value for use, if reparation is to be adequate.").
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Court explained that determining a reasonable royalty is unlike
measuring damages for a breach of contract or a tort and that, as a
result, there is nothing wrong with "correct[ing] uncertain
prophecies." 18 6 To do so "is not to charge the offender with
elements of value nonexistent at the time of his offense," but
instead "to bring out and expose to light the elements of value that
were there from the beginning."18 7 Notably, this reasoning tracks
the reasoning justifying the assumption of validity built into the
reasonable royalty analysis; it too "corrects uncertain prophecies"
and "exposes to light the elements of value" of the patented
technology that existed prior to a determination of liability. The
book of wisdom doctrine eliminates discounting of the value of the
patented technology due to imperfect information related to that
value at a time just before infringement, while the assumption of
validity eliminates discounting of the value of the patented
technology due to imperfect information related to the validity of
the patent. 188
Justice Cardozo also highlighted, more generally, the problem
of allowing the hypothetical negotiation construct itself to govern
the determination of damages for patent infringement, because the
hypothetical negotiation may devalue the patented technology. He
explained that "[v]alue for exchange is not the only value known to
the law of damages" and that "[t]here are times when heed must
be given to value for use, if reparation is to be adequate."189
Notably, Justice Cardozo suggested that, "[tihe market test failing,
there must be reference to the values inherent in the thing itself,
whether for use or for exchange."1 90  Thus, at least in
circumstances where reference to the market provides inadequate
reparation to a patent owner, Justice Cardozo suggested that
courts seek to award the value related to the patent owner's use or
sale of the patented technology.1 91 Thus, the Court's opinion in
18 Id. at 698.
187 Id.
188 See supra notes 90-92. This reasoning also calls into question the universality of the
modern, widely-accepted conception of reasonable royalties as providing a tort law make-
whole remedy. Sichelman, supra note 21, at 560.
189 Sinclair Ref., 289 U.S. at 699.
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 Id. (' The market test failing, there must be reference to the values inherent in the
thing itself, whether for use or for exchange. These will not be known by first imagining a
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Sinclair Refining, like its opinion in Suffolk, reflects a sense that
the relevant value is the value of the patented technology.
A modern case citing Sinclair Refining explains that the
hypothetical negotiation construct "speaks of negotiations as of the
time infringement began, yet [the book of wisdom doctrine]
permits and often requires a court to look to events and facts that
occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or
predicted by the hypothesized negotiators."'192 Theoretically, these
events and facts may include the jury's later determination of
infringement and no invalidity, thus providing another way to
explain the assumptions of validity and infringement. But, as a
practical matter, in litigation these events and facts typically
include sales data and actual profits so that the hypothetical
negotiation construct, conducted after-the-fact based on the time
period before infringement, will reflect later reality.193 For years,
moreover, courts have limited the book of wisdom doctrine to
benefit patent owners rather than infringers. 94  Thus, for
example, the Federal Circuit has not allowed infringers to rely
upon evidence of less-than-anticipated profits in an effort to reduce
reasonable royalties. 95 As a result, in practice, Sinclair Refining
has not exactly focused the attention of courts on the value of
patented technology, let alone on its true value rather than its
expected value in every instance.
B. SPECIFIC REFORMS TO FOCUS ON THE VALUE OF PATENTED
TECHNOLOGY
There are several specific reforms that would make the law
governing reasonable royalties further reflect valuation of
patented technology rather than valuation of patent rights.
1. Elimination of the Hypothetical Negotiation Construct.
Courts probably would not use the hypothetical negotiation
forced sale, and then accepting as a measure its probable results. The law is not so tender
to sellers in default." (citation omitted)).
192 Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
193 See, e.g., id. at 1577 (discussing the plaintiffs profits and sales data in determining a
reasonable royalty).
194 Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691, 726
(1992) (criticizing the Federal Circuit for "steadfastly refus[ing] to allow defendants the
same privilege of the crystal ball in order to reduce their liability for reasonable royalties").
195 Id. at 726.
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construct if they sought to focus exclusively on the value of
patented technology. Indeed, use of the hypothetical negotiation
construct exacerbates focus on factors reflecting the value of
patent rights instead of only the value of patented technology.
196
It is built upon the idea of replicating negotiated royalties, when
negotiated royalties necessarily reflect the value of patent rights
and not just the value of the patented technology. 197 As discussed
above, for example, negotiated royalties will include discounts
based on the patent owner's risks associated with liability, relief,
and enforceability.1 98 Negotiated royalties may also include a
discount if the patent owner has higher costs to negotiate and
litigate compared to a potential infringer. 199  Or they may
overcompensate the patent owner if the patent owner has lower
costs to negotiate and litigate compared to a potential infringer.
200
In place of the hypothetical negotiation, one possibility is to use
a modified version of the analytical method in appropriate
circumstances. 20 Unlike the original version of the analytical
method, it would focus on the patent owner's profitability. This
modified version of the analytical method would thus seek to
identify the difference between the patent owner's usual net profit
and its potential or anticipated net profit realized from use of the
patented technology. Like the original version of the analytical
method, though, it would ignore the value associated with the
patent owner's right to seek injunctive or monetary relief or
impose costs through negotiation or litigation.
It seems unlikely, however-absent statutory reform-that
courts would dispense with use of the hypothetical negotiation
given the primary benefit from its use, its ease of
conceptualization, and its extensive historical pedigree as a
common law doctrine. Thus, perhaps more realistic reforms would
seek to devise additional assumptions to correct for aspects of the
hypothetical negotiation construct that continue to allow for
196 See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing valuation of patent rights using
negotiated royalties).
198 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
200 See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.




valuation based on patent rights,202 or to reform the law governing
reasonable royalties in other ways.
2. Use of Additional Assumptions. Additional assumptions,
besides the existing assumptions of validity and infringement, 203
technically would be necessary for the use of the hypothetical
negotiation construct to result in valuation only of patented
technology.
First, if the goal of the assessment of a reasonable royalty is to
identify the value of the patented technology, consider potential
undercompensation to the patent owner. To avoid incorporating
discounts, assumptions of clear liability, entitlement to relief, and
enforceability of the patent would be necessary in addition to
existing assumptions of validity and infringement. To avoid
allowing the royalty to be reduced in light of the potential for
higher cost to the patent owner to negotiate and litigate an
infringement claim (as compared to the potential infringer), an
assumption would be necessary that, for purposes of the
hypothetical negotiation, any negotiation or future litigation would
be costless or that the cost to both parties would be the same. In
addition, one would need to assume that the parties are equally
risk averse.
Second, again if the goal of the assessment of a reasonable
royalty is to identify the value of the patented technology, consider
potential overcompensation to the patent owner. To avoid
extraction of value from the potential to impose higher negotiation
and litigation costs on accused infringers, it would be necessary to
use an assumption that any negotiation or future litigation would
be costless or that the cost to the parties would be equal.
Similarly, to avoid extraction of value based on the availability of
other monetary remedies-such as enhanced damages or
202 On the other hand, use of many corrective assumptions calls into question the use of
the hypothetical negotiation construct in the first place. Criticism of the hypothetical
negotiation construct based upon its need for corrective assumptions is not new. See, e.g.,
Janicke, supra note 194, at 722 ('CThe list of justice-oriented premises that courts have now
artificially encrusted upon the concept of hypothetical negotiation causes one to wonder
whether the concept has outlived its usefulness.").
203 While recent patent reform efforts in Congress failed with respect to amending the
statutory sections governing the awards of monetary relief in patent cases, one of the
proposals is notable because it would have codified the assumption of validity built into the




attorneys' fees-an assumption that the patent owner would
recover only reasonable royalties would be necessary. Again, one
would also need to assume that the parties are equally risk averse.
There are other possible reasons for the hypothetical
negotiation to result in valuation of patent rights and thereby
overcompensate the patent owner. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro
have theorized that patent owners may be able to extract
inappropriately high negotiated royalties based in part on "patent
holdup" and "royalty stacking. ' 20 4 "Patent holdup" refers to the
ability of patent holders to threaten injunctive relief against
accused infringers that have "already invested heavily to design,
manufacture, market, and sell the product with the allegedly
infringing feature" in order "to negotiate royalties far in excess of
the patent holder's true economic contribution."205  "Royalty
stacking refers to situations in which a single product potentially
infringes on many patents, and thus may bear multiple royalty
burdens."20 6 According to Lemley and Shapiro, "royalty stacking
magnifies the problems associated with injunction threats and
holdup, and greatly so if many patents read on the same
product."207  While others have criticized their analysis, 208 one
thing Lemley and Shapiro highlight is their belief that it is
possible in particular situations for reasonable royalties to exceed
the value of patented technology. 20 9
To avoid extraction of value from patent holdup, the time period
for the hypothetical negotiation should be assumed to be just prior
to any investment by the infringer in developing or using the
patented technology.210 Adopting this time frame for the analysis
204 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1993 (reasoning that the threat of patent
holdup and royalty stacking provides patent holders too much leverage); Shapiro, supra
note 5, at 283 (asserting that "[t]he prospect of such holdup affects the negotiating
strengths of the two parties").
205 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1993.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See generally Elhauge, supra note 5; Golden, 'Patent Trolls," supra note 6; Sidak,
supra note 5.
209 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2025 (indicating that "patentees can obtain
royalties that exceed the value of their contribution to the product").
210 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12, at 22 (recommending that courts "set the
hypothetical negotiation at an early stage of product development'). This assumption




would eliminate valuation of the disruption of the accused
infringer's business and focus valuation on the value of the
technology. Likewise, to avoid overcompensation associated with
the problem of royalty stacking, an assumption should be made
that the parties would take into account all of the patented
technology and potential royalty burdens, which would assume
foreknowledge of future patenting activities and royalty
agreements. 211
3. Adjustments to Negotiated Royalties. What these additional
assumptions would, in part, require are adjustments to negotiated
royalties relied upon by parties as indicative of a reasonable
royalty. That is, negotiated royalties (so called "comparable
agreements" or "comparables") need to be adjusted to reflect these
corrective assumptions before they are used as reasonable
royalties.
As seen in ResQNet.com and Rude, when determining
reasonable royalties courts often refuse to consider settlement
agreements or only reluctantly consider them. 212 To the extent
they do so because of the risk that these agreements reflect the
value of injunctive relief or attorneys' fees and the relative risk
aversion of the parties, their exclusion reflects an attempt to focus
on valuation of patented technology. Another approach, however,
is to adjust the negotiated royalties included in these settlement
agreements to reflect the assumptions already described.
But all license agreements, regardless of their proximity in time
to litigation, must be evaluated to determine the extent to which
they reflect the value of patent rights rather than the value of
patented technology. Any license agreement may include
discounts due to probabilities associated with liability, relief, and
enforceability and the patent owner's costs and level of risk
aversion. An agreement may also include extraction of value
based on patent holdup, royalty stacking, litigation costs,
211 How the parties would actually determine the value of one particular patent in a
royalty stacking scenario, however, is a different, difficult problem. Joseph Farrell et al.,
Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 642 (2007) (assessing the
difficulty of this task).




enhanced damages, and the accused infringer's costs and level of
risk aversion.
In short, to the extent that negotiated royalties are inconsistent
with the assumptions I have described, the negotiated royalties
must be adjusted. Rather than excluding evidence of negotiated
royalties, economists may adjust negotiated royalties based on the
extent to which they reflect valuation of patent rights. Indeed, to
the extent settlement agreements reflect more certainty regarding
liability, economists may be able to use them, rather than other
agreements, to identify more easily the true value of patented
technology.218
Relatedly, if the law fully embraced valuation of patented
technology, courts would not award unadjusted established
royalties as reasonable royalties. Awards of unadjusted
established royalties are inconsistent with providing compensation
to patent owners equal to the value of patented technology.
Unadjusted established royalties, because they are negotiated
royalties, reflect valuation of patent rights. Parties effectively
agree to adjustments to the value of the patented technology based
on the patent owner's risks related to liability, relief, and
enforcement, the patent owner's relative level of risk aversion,
relative cost, and other factors.214
As described above, the law moved in the direction of limiting
use of unadjusted established royalties when Judge Hand rejected
a royalty established during disrepute of a patent based on
suspected invalidity, and modern courts apply assumptions of
validity and infringement to reasonable royalty calculations.
215
Moreover, modern law typically allows for consideration of an
established royalty as a starting point for evaluation of a proper
reasonable royalty rather than as a reasonable royalty in and of
213 Cf. id. at 349-50 (stating that courts may consider "[t]he effect of litigation costs on the
terms of the settlement license... to determine the extent to which the terms of the
settlement license provide useful guidance"). But see ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594
F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("This court observes.., that the most reliable license in this
record arose out of litigation. On other occasions, this court has acknowledged that the
hypothetical reasonable royalty calculation occurs before litigation and that litigation itself
can skew the results of the hypothetical negotiation.... Similarly this court has long
recognized that a reasonable royalty can be different than a given royalty when, for
example, widespread infringement artificially depressed past licenses." (citations omitted)).
214 See generally Schlicher, supra note 5.
215 See supra Part III.B.
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itself.216 But there is still law indicating that established royalties,
when they exist, are the "best measure" of reasonable royalties. 217
For reasonable royalties to reflect only the value of patented
technology, it must be a requirement that negotiated royalties,
including established royalties, be adjusted to correct for their
reflection of the value of patent rights.
Of course these and other potential reforms focusing reasonable
royalties only on the value of patented technology would not
necessarily make determining reasonable royalties easy or
inexpensive. Identifying the value of patented technology is not
easy or inexpensive. Moreover, even if the law perfectly focused on
the value of patented technology, there would still be several open
questions. I turn to these open questions next.
C. OPEN QUESTIONS RELATED TO VALUING PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
If the decision is made to focus the law governing reasonable
royalties exclusively on the value of patented technology-to
embrace the paradigm shift this Article contemplates-several
questions remain that would affect how any reform might be
implemented. This subpart identifies several of these open
questions. 218
216 See, e.g., Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Paragon Optical Inc., Nos. CIV-84-260-PHX-WPC &
CIV-85-910-PHX-WPC, 1987 WL 124333, at *63 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 1987) ("Although pre-
existing royalty rates are evidence of a reasonable royalty, the law is explicit that prior
royalty rates establish only a minimum floor below which reasonable royalty damages
cannot fall." (citing TransWorld Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1984))).
217 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("An
established royalty is usually the best measure of a 'reasonable' royalty for a given use of an
invention because it removes the need to guess at the terms to which parties would
hypothetically agree.").
218 In this Article, I seek to focus attention on the fundamental principle of using
reasonable royalties to value patented technology. As this Part of the Article shows,
however, this attention highlights several open questions. To be clear, I do not purport to
answer here all of these open questions. Instead I seek to identify them, to analyze briefly




1. Value Perspective: Patent Owner, Infringer, or Society. Even
if there is agreement on using reasonable royalties to value
patented technology, a relevant question is "value to whom": the
value the patented technology provides to the patent owner, to the
infringer, or to society? Savings or marginal profits earned by an
infringer due to use of patented technology reflect the value of the
patented technology to the infringer, while savings or marginal
profits earned by the patent owner due to use of patented
technology reflect its value to the patent owner. Should
reasonable royalties reflect either of these values, or instead, the
value to society?
Consider each option. A first option is to have reasonable
royalties reflect the value of use of the patented invention by the
patent owner, which is another way of describing the patent
owner's lost profits.219 A second option is to have reasonable
royalties reflect the value of use of the patented invention by the
infringer, which is another way of saying the infringer's profits
derived from the patented invention.220 In accounting terms,
either of these two options would involve comparing the relevant
party's profit absent use of the patented technology with its profit
given use of the patented technology. Any difference between the
patent owner's change in profit and the infringer's change in profit
would reflect the two parties' relative efficiencies. In economic
terms, either of these two options would involve comparing the
relevant party's producer surplus absent use of the patented
technology with its producer surplus given use of the patented
technology. Of these two options, the value to the patent owner
seems more appropriate because reasonable royalties are
presumed damages provided to compensate patent owners for
infringement and to stimulate or reward their inventive
activities. 221 And as it turns out, there is precedent indicating that
this is the required perspective. 222 Thus, courts could use the
219 This option presumes that, for some reason, the patent owner is not able to obtain an
award for its lost profits. Cf. Lemley, supra note 6, at 656 (criticizing use of reasonable
royalties to estimate lost profits).
220 Consider, for example, the possibility that the infringer is able to exploit a market
inaccessible to the patent owner.
221 See discussion of "general damages," infra notes 308-09.
222 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (plurality
opinion) ("The purpose of the [statutory] change [in 1946] was precisely to eliminate the
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modified version of the analytical method I have described to
determine reasonable royalties by comparing the patent owner's
profits with and without use of the patented technology. 223
A third option, however, is to have reasonable royalties reflect
the value society gains by use of the patented technology. In
economic terms, this would be measured by comparing social
welfare absent use of the patented technology with social welfare
given use of the patented technology. It is an open question
whether patent owners are entitled to all of this difference, and I
return to this concept below when I address the extent to which
courts should award the full value of patented technology.224
Significantly, the hypothetical negotiation construct seeks to
identify a value of patent rights on a spectrum between the value
to a patent owner and the value to an infringer, the exact value
determined as a matter of bargaining power. 225 The lack of a
definitive resolution as to where within this range the appropriate
balance should be struck fosters uncertainty regarding how a fact-
finder will award a reasonable royalty in any given situation. This
same uncertainty might apply to assessments of reasonable
royalties based upon the value of patented technologies unless a
particular party's value is selected.
2. Subjective Versus Objective Valuation. A related unresolved
question is whether the value of patented technology is a
subjective one or an objective one. The hypothetical negotiation
construct-at least somewhat-abstracts away from particular
patent owners and particular infringers, instead relying upon an
imaginary willing patent owner and an imaginary willing
licensee.226 If the focus of a reasonable royalty assessment is on
the value of patented technology, a similar question exists.
recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages only."); id. at 507 ("[T]o determine
the damages that may be recovered from [the infringer] here, we must ask how much [the
patent owner] suffered by [the infringer's] infringement-how much it would have made if
[the infringer] had not infringed.").
223 See supra Part V.A.1.
224 See infra Part V.C.5.
225 When a patent owner's value is higher than an infringer's value, there is no room for
negotiation. Courts have adopted the patent owner's value in this situation.
226 See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 76 (Fed. Cir.
2012) ("[The basic question posed in a hypothetical negotiation is: if, on the eve of
infringement, a willing licensor and licensee had entered into an agreement instead of
allowing infringement of the patent to take place, what would that agreement be?").
[Vol. 49:79
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Regardless of whether the value is from the perspective of the
patent owner or the infringer, is the value that of the particular
party, or instead an ordinary patent owner or an ordinary
infringer? If the assessment of damages is primarily remedial, the
value to the particular party seems appropriate. But if the
assessment of damages is primarily to shape incentives for future
conduct by other potential parties, the perspective of an ordinary
party may be more appropriate.
3. Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Use of the Patented
Technology. To the extent that the value of the patented
technology lies in its ability to increase demand and allow its user
to increase the price of related goods or services at a given level of
supply, another relevant, unresolved question is whether the
reasonable royalty should reflect exclusive use of the patented
technology or non-exclusive use of the technology. This issue can
be tied to whether the law governing the determination of
reasonable royalties under the hypothetical negotiation construct
should presume that, absent an agreement, the patent owner
would obtain injunctive relief. If reasonable royalties are
determined based on an assumption of injunctive relief, then
reasonable royalties presumably value exclusive use of the
patented technology. If reasonable royalties are determined based
on an assumption of no injunctive relief, then reasonable royalties
presumably value non-exclusive use of the patented technology.
One of the Georgia-Pacific factors is the "nature and scope of
the license (exclusive or nonexclusive, restricted or nonrestricted
by territory or product type)."227 While this factor highlights a
focus on patent rights-nature and scope of the license rather than
nature and scope of the use of the patented technology-it also
highlights the importance of deciding whether use would be
exclusive or non-exclusive. Exclusive use would support a higher
reasonable royalty in the absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes-market power could be exploited. Non-exclusive use
would allow for competition from others using the patented
technology, preventing, or at least limiting, the ability to use
market power even in the absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes. But Georgia-Pacific and the hypothetical negotiation
227 Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 27 n.l (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(quoting i4i LTD P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
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construct leave the determination to the fact-finder whether an
exclusive license or a non-exclusive license would be appropriate;
they make resolution of this matter a question of past practices by
the patent owner as well as bargaining power and other factors
affecting licensing negotiations. 2 8
Some economists have stressed that the reasonable royalty
should focus on the value of non-exclusive licensing (and therefore
non-exclusive use) of the patented technology. 229 Others, however,
have stressed the opposite.230 While economists typically present
these arguments in the context of the hypothetical negotiation
construct, and, therefore, to valuation based on patent rights, their
arguments apply equally to valuation of patented technology. In
other words, to the extent reasonable royalties focus on the value
of use of patented technology, the question regarding exclusivity is
still relevant.
To resolve uncertainties, the law should make clear whether
reasonable royalties should reflect exclusive or non-exclusive use
of patented technology rather than leaving the matter to the fact-
finder to determine based on past practices by the patent owner as
well as bargaining power and other factors affecting licensing
negotiations. An assumption of non-exclusivity would effectively
create a compulsory licensing scheme, while an assumption of
exclusivity would effectively provide patent owners with the
highest possible economic value of their patented technologies,
which would depend on competition from available non-infringing
alternatives.
4. Anticipated Versus Actual Value. Another open question
relates to whether the relevant value is the anticipated value of
the patented technology or its actual value. The hypothetical
negotiation construct seems to focus on projections made by patent
228 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
229 See, e.g., Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 819 ("Under ideal circumstances, a
Licensing Comparables analysis is based on a real-world license that is essentially identical
to the hypothetical license. Such a real-world license would be naked, nonexclusive, and
cover only the infringed patent.").
230 See, e.g., 2 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
§ 13:150 (2d ed. 2012) ("In a hypothetical negotiation in the absence of infringement, the
patent owner will seek a royalty that would maximize licensing revenue. Licensing revenue
will be maximized if the patent owner licenses at a rate equal to the rate of profit that a
single supplier would make when selling at the most profitable price and quantity.").
[Vol. 49:79
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owners and potential infringers because the hypothetical
negotiation is set just before infringement begins. 231 But the book
of wisdom doctrine permits consideration of later, actual sales data
and profits, and therefore in some circumstances allows for
determinations of actual value rather than projections of value.2 32
If it is more appropriate to award actual value rather than the
projected value,233 there would be no reason to focus on the time
period just before infringement began (consistent with current
law) 234 or just before any decision was made to invest in developing
or using patented technology (as others have suggested);235 the
assessment of reasonable royalties would use hindsight to
determine actual value of patented technologies. Actual sales data
and profits rather than projected sales data and profits would be
relevant data, regardless of previous projections.
5. All Versus Some of the Value. Another unresolved question
is whether patent owners should be awarded all of the value
associated with use of their inventions, only enough to exceed
marginal costs to create some reasonable profit, or only the
marginal incremental value of the patented technology. A related
problem is that it is not possible to identify the value of use of the
patented technology in every situation.
In this last regard, consider the situation of complementary
technologies. One problem related to complementary technologies
231 See Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
232 See Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("At
times the only evidence available may be that supplied by testimony of experts as to the
state of the art, the character of the improvement, and the probable increase of efficiency or
savings of expense .... This will generally be the case if the trial follows quickly after the
issue of the patent. But a different situation is presented if years have gone by before the
evidence is offered. Experience is then available to correct uncertain prophecy. Here is a
book of wisdom that courts may not neglect. We find no rule of law that sets a clasp upon
its pages, and forbids us to look within .. " (quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum
Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933))).
233 Gregory Sidak effectively advocates for awards of reasonable royalties to reflect actual
value rather than projected value given what he calls the "real option value": the ability of
copiers to sit on the sideline and wait to copy only successful technologies. See Sidak, supra
note 5, at 736-43.
234 See Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
235 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12, at 22 (recommending that courts set the
hypothetical negotiation at an early stage of product development). This assumption would
eliminate any need to assume that the patent owner would not obtain injunctive relief.
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is the so-called "Cournot complements" problem.23 6 This problem
relates to "royalty stacking" and the theory that inventors of
complementary inventions are unable to each charge users of their
inventions the price that would maximize their own profits.237
That is, "when multiple firms engage in complementary
innovation, it is not possible... for each innovator's reward to
equal its invention's incremental contribution."238 In other words,
in situations involving complementary technologies, reasonable
royalties cannot equal the entire marginal value of the patented
technology. Any assessment of reasonable royalties must correct
for this potential problem by taking into account complementary
technologies and identifying relative contributions to their gross
value, which, at a minimum, is a "difficult task that will not have
an ideal solution."239  One can imagine a scenario, however, in
which it is not really possible to identify the marginal value of use
of certain patented technology. This scenario occurs when the
patented technology is useful only with other technology, and the
other technology is useful only with the patented technology. If
the marginal incremental profit of a device implementing the
combined technology is $10, it is not clear how much of that $10
should be attributed to the patented technology versus the other
technology. A division of the profit between the technologies
would seem to be arbitrary.
More generally, however, as Mark Lemley has explained, "[t]he
assumption that intellectual property owners should be entitled to
capture the full social surplus of their invention runs counter to
our economic intuitions in every other segment of the economy. '"240
Indeed, there is reason to think that patent owners should not be
entitled even to the entire difference in consumer surplus caused
by the use of patented technology, even if it is identifiable, but
236 See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
THEORY OF WEALTH 99-104 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1960) (1838)
(describing how this problem arises with jointly consumed commodities).
237 Cotter, Patent Holdup, supra note 6, at 1169 ("As explained by Augustin Cournot
almost two centuries ago, when separate owners of complementary inputs each demand
what is (for them) the individually profit-maximizing price, in exchange for permission to
include those inputs in an end product, the cost of producing the end product will result in a
price for the end product that is higher than the social optimum.').
238 Id. (quoting Farrell et al., supra note 211, at 622).
239 Farrell et al., supra note 211, at 642.
240 Lemley, supra note 152, at 1046.
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instead only to "a return in excess of marginal cost."'24 ' This
argument, which is based on a purely incentive-driven analysis of
remedies, strikes at the core understanding of the purpose of
reasonable royalties. If reasonable royalties reflect the value of
patented technologies rather than patent rights, this argument
remains relevant. In short, should reasonable royalties
compensate patent owners for the full marginal value of the
patented technology or instead whatever amount is enough to
induce the creation of the patented technology? 242
While these theories suggest that potential inventors should
obtain a reasonable return just above the marginal costs required
to create patented technology, this conception of reasonable
royalties would allow significant uncertainty and unpredictability
to remain; the only way to determine whether any proposed
reasonable royalty is truly "reasonable" would be to litigate-or
perhaps arbitrate243-the matter to resolution. A more definite
241 Id. at 1059.
242 For a recent, extended analysis of this question as applied to all legal remedies in
patent infringement cases, see generally Ted Sichelman's article entitled Purging Patent
Law of "Private Law" Remedies, supra note 21. In his article, Sichelman argues that
private law remedies derived from tort law that seek to return patent owners to their
economic position prior to infringement fail to focus on advancing the relevant policy
underlying patent law, the promotion of innovation. Id. at 519. He also shows how "make-
whole damages" fixated on tort law-based compensation schemes-rather than a patent
law-based incentive scheme-may overcompensate or undercompensate patent owners
depending on the relevant circumstances. Id. at 555-60.
243 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have proposed a solution to the problems associated
with identifying compliance with FRAND (fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) patent
licensing commitments made by members of standard setting organizations. Mark A.
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1138 (2013). Their solution is based on so-
called "baseball-style" arbitration. Id. It is noteworthy that Lemley and Shapiro advocate
for no assumption of liability built into their determination of a FRAND royalty. Id. at
1139. They seek to build into the FRAND royalty a discount based on the potential for
invalidity and non-infringement. Id. at 1150-52. They do so regardless of the "double
discount" others have identified as associated with royalties calculated in litigation. Id. at
1147 n.34. Presumably they do so because of low costs associated with arbitration, as well
as the fact that in their proposal the arbitrator would be called upon only to identify the
likelihood of liability rather than whether there actually is liability. Id. at 1145, 1152.
They do not address the burden that the patent holder has to bear the risk "twice"-once in
advance of the arbitration and once at the arbitration. Their model therefore is based on a
particular valuation of patent rights rather than exclusively on valuation of patented
technology. That, however, may be unavoidable given that what they seek to do is to
evaluate whether actual negotiated royalties comply with a commitment to negotiate
royalties in a certain manner. As I have explained, negotiated royalties value patent rights
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baseline, rather than one focused on reasonableness, would
seemingly both reduce the need for a dispute resolution
mechanism and reduce the complexity of any such mechanism.
On the other hand, while increasing certainty, awarding all of
the infringer's profit as a categorical rule governing all awards of
reasonable royalties would effectively reinstitute disgorgement of
profits as a remedy for patent infringement. At least according to
the Supreme Court, Congress eliminated this remedy in 1952.244
Moreover, as a matter of policy, disgorgement risks over-
deterrence of potentially innovative conduct.
The answer to this problem may be to seek to award the
marginal incremental profit associated with use of the patented
technology. Mark Lemley has argued that a reasonable royalty
"might serve as a reasonable proxy for the intrinsic value of [a
patented] innovation .... even if its relationship to real social
contribution is somewhat arbitrary. ' '245 But a reasonable royalty
arguably serves as a reasonable proxy of this value only if profit is
apportioned to reflect the marginal incremental value of the
patented technology. 246 Indeed, rather than seeking to identify
rather than just patented technologies. Thus, it is not surprising that Lemley and Shapiro's
methodology reflects the value of patent rights.
244 See infra note 307 (discussing disgorgement).
245 Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV. 107,
114 (2014).
246 See, e.g., Bailey et al., supra note 5, at 259 ("Under a sound economic approach, the
reasonable royalty award (in dollars) should reflect the incremental value (in dollars) of the
patented technology to the defendant as compared to the next best alternative."); Landers,
supra note 6, at 476-77 (stating that an apportionment "approach requires an evaluation of
the infringed claim's advance over existing knowledge"). Notably, in Dowagiac, the
Supreme Court did not reverse its holding in Coupe, see Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 649 (1915), and one might harbor the false impression that Coupe
rejected valuation of patented technology. One might harbor this false impression because
the patent owner in Coupe did introduce evidence of the expected cost savings from using
the patented technology, and yet the Court still required only a nominal award rather than
a reasonable royalty. Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 583 (1895). The requirement to provide
evidence to apportion profits, however, explains both the Court's holding in Coupe and why
that holding should not be understood broadly to represent the view that evidence of the
value of patented technology is insufficient. As highlighted later in Dowagiac, the Court's
holding in Coupe turned on a failure of proof, in particular the absence of evidence of what
portion of the cost savings the reasonable royalty should be. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 649.
Besides explaining how Coupe does not broadly reject the concept of valuation of patented
technology, this view of Coupe may suggest that the answer to this question-about
whether the patent owner is entitled to all of the value associated with its use-is not open.
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what a reasonable return just above the marginal costs required to
create patented technology is-a rather uncertain and
unpredictable quest-the better approach may be to seek to
identify the marginal incremental profit associated with use of the
patented technology.
Notably, each of the open questions identified here already
exists under the current methods of calculating reasonable
royalties, which allow for valuation of patent rights. This is
because valuing patent rights necessarily includes as one of its
components the valuation of patented technology. If a decision is
made to focus reasonable royalties only on the value of patented
technology, however, it would provide an opportunity to confront
and resolve these questions to provide additional clarity, certainty,
and predictability with respect to the law governing reasonable
royalties.
VI. ELIMINATING PROBLEMS BY FOCUSING ON THE VALUE OF
PATENTED TECHNOLOGY
Even if these open questions are not resolved, focusing the law
governing reasonable royalties on identifying the value of patented
technology would provide several important benefits.
A. ELIMINATING CIRCULARITY AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
I have described the circularity problem associated with using
negotiated royalties to calculate reasonable royalties and vice
versa. 247  Parties negotiate royalties in view of potential
reasonable royalties; they assess negotiated royalties based on
expected reasonable royalties. But, likewise, courts determine
appropriate royalties in the shadow of negotiated royalties; they
assess reasonable royalties based on past negotiated royalties.
This circularity, left unchecked, may devalue reasonable royalties
given risk associated with liability, relief, and enforcement. This
In effect, the Court seemed to say, "No, just part of it. And you have to introduce evidence
to show how much of it."
247 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
20141
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
circularity, however, left unchecked, may also overvalue
reasonable royalties given other considerations.
Consider, first, devaluation of reasonable royalties given the
patent owner's risk. As I have mentioned, one partial solution to
this particular circularity problem is to use assumptions, including
but not limited to the assumptions of validity and infringement. 248
As I have described, courts developed the assumption of validity
built into the reasonable royalty calculation following the decision
by Judge Hand to reject the use of a royalty established after a
circuit court found a patent invalid but before the Supreme Court
found the patent not invalid.249 The reason for the assumption of
validity in this context is clear: an established royalty reflects a
general consensus regarding the expected validity of a patent;
without adjusting an established royalty upward to account for the
difference between the previous consensus regarding expected
validity and the judgment confirming validity, setting a reasonable
royalty equal to an established royalty has the pernicious effect of
encouraging further discounting by negotiating parties. As I have
shown, the same thing can be said of reasonable royalty
calculations based on unadjusted negotiated royalties; without
adjusting the negotiated royalties upward to account for the
difference between the parties' expectations regarding validity and
the judgment confirming validity, setting a reasonable royalty
equal to negotiated royalties has a similar effect of encouraging
additional discounting by negotiating parties.250 While Judge
Hand focused on validity given the facts he confronted, additional
assumptions are required besides an assumption of validity to
account for the circularity, including assumptions of liability
(covering validity, infringement, and equitable defenses), relief,
and enforceability.
Now consider how the circularity inherent in the hypothetical
negotiation, left unchecked, may overvalue reasonable royalties.
In particular, if negotiated royalties used to calculate reasonable
royalties are not representative of the complete range of
negotiated royalties, but instead are selected from the more
expensive end of the range, then the resulting, calculated
248 See supra Part V.A.3.
249 See supra Part III.B.
250 See supra Part IV.B.
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reasonable royalties will exceed the true reasonable royalties.
Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have made the argument that
there is such a selection effect, and that this effect causes
reasonable royalties to exceed a benchmark for reasonable
royalties.251 A possible solution to this possibility is increased
rigor in the analysis of alleged comparable negotiated royalties to
identify and correct for selection effects. Another way in which the
circularity problem, left unchecked, may overvalue reasonable
royalties results from patent holdup and royalty stacking. To the
extent patent holdup and royalty stacking may cause negotiated
royalties to exceed the value of patented technology in particular
situations,252 the circular nature of the hypothetical negotiation
construct may cause reasonable royalties to exceed the value of the
patented technology in those situations. 253
The circularity problem and the potential for undervaluation or
overvaluation, however, results from use of the hypothetical
negotiation construct and its focus on valuing patent rights rather
than patented technology. If courts shift the focus of the
reasonable royalty analysis to the actual value of the patented
technology, there is no longer circularity and the potential for
systemic undervaluation or overvaluation is reduced. Indeed,
dispensing with the circularity associated with the hypothetical
negotiation construct would eliminate the need to use so many
corrective assumptions. And by focusing only on the actual value
of patented technology, the analysis would be easier to perform,
presumably resulting in cost savings as well as increased accuracy
and predictability, as discussed in more detail below.254
B. INCREASING GUIDANCE AND ACCURACY
Focusing the analysis on the value of patented technology
would provide significant guidance for experts, juries, and courts.
A common criticism of the Georgia-Pacific factors is that they
provide little guidance to experts, juries, and courts. In the words
251 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2022.
252 See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
253 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2021-22 ('CThe consequence of this circularity is
that reasonable royalties are elevated above the benchmark level.").
254 See infra Part VI.B-C.
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of critics, they are "poorly defined and explained 255 and provide
"little or no practical guidance." 256  Likewise, the hypothetical
negotiation construct is said to be "poorly grounded and loosely
defined."257  As a result, attempts have been made to better
explain the relevance of individual factors, for example by
grouping them into logical components of a structured test for
assessing reasonable royalties.258 These attempts, however, fail to
the extent that they do not identify a unifying goal for a
reasonable royalty analysis. Focusing the analysis on the value of
patented technology would provide that unifying goal. It would
also effectively provide context for consideration of the Georgia-
Pacific factors, should some be retained as suggestions of the kind
of evidence that might be relevant to the ultimate question of the
value of the patented technology.
Identifying the goal of valuing patented technology would also
increase the accuracy of reasonable royalty calculations. Because
the Georgia-Pacific factors and the hypothetical negotiation
construct fail to identify the goal of the reasonable royalty
determination, other than the circular notion of reflecting the
result of a hypothetical negotiation based on a slew of competing
considerations, a critique is that they are not tied to any
conception of what constitutes an accurate determination of a
reasonable royalty. In short, the law fails to identify a clear, non-
circular substantive goal of the reasonable royalty calculation.259
Instead, the law largely places the procedure of the analysis before
255 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 808.
256 Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631.
257 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 807.
258 Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 629 (breaking the Georgia-Pacific test down to three
fundamental questions).
259 One way to address the lack of a non-circular substantive goal of the reasonable
royalty calculation within the hypothetical negotiation construct is to defime exactly how
parties would reach agreement on the appropriate reasonable royalty without considering
actions the patent owner or a court might take to enforce any patent rights. In this regard,
the assumption of validity seeks to remove from consideration the possibility that a court
might invalidate a patent. As I have discussed, however, additional assumptions would be
necessary to eliminate completely the inherent circularity built into the hypothetical
negotiation construct. See supra Part V.B.2. But even without any circularity, the law
currently does not identify a clear substantive goal of the hypothetical negotiation itself.
The two options I identify here are either (1) to value the patent rights, which--after
eliminating circularity by eliminating consideration of actions a court might take to enforce
any patent rights-would be particularly ironic; or (2) to value the patented technology.
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its substance. Relatedly, a familiar criticism is that the
hypothetical negotiation seems to be based on the conception that
bargaining power is a critical component of the appropriate way to
determine reasonable royalties, and therefore that discounts or
surcharges based on bargaining power are critical components of
reasonable royalties themselves. Scholars have recently debated
the appropriateness of allowing bargaining power to impact
reasonable royalties and negotiated royalties. 260 In the absence of
agreement regarding the substantive goal of reasonable royalty
calculations, it is easy to criticize results as inaccurate. 261 If the
law identifies the goal of the reasonable royalty analysis as
determining the value of the patented technology, by contrast, it
would at least provide a clear target. As a result, it would be
easier to identify error in particular instances, resulting in greater
overall accuracy as steps can be taken to correct for these errors.
Courts may be able to increase accuracy by dispensing with the
hypothetical negotiation construct given its focus on negotiated
royalties and inherent circularity, and instead adopt a modified
version of the analytical method.262  The alternative I have
identified is to maintain the hypothetical negotiation construct,
but require additional corrective assumptions to eliminate
valuation based on patent rights.263 But there is reason to think
that juries may not apply these assumptions to their logical
conclusions. In this regard, consider what an assumption of
liability requires a jury to do. Somewhat ironically, according to
the assumption of liability, a jury should apply a higher multiplier
to negotiated royalties in close cases compared to easy cases.
Consider two examples. For the first example, assume (1) a
close case in which a jury ultimately concludes that an accused
infringer is liable for patent infringement, and (2) that for
260 Compare Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 1997-99 (including bargaining power as a
variable in a benchmark reasonable royalty rate), Shapiro, supra note 5, at 288-89 (same),
and Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 2164-68 (arguing that bargaining power is an
appropriate factor in a benchmark reasonable royalty rate), with Elhauge, supra note 5, at
543, 545 (arguing that bargaining power is not an appropriate factor in a benchmark
reasonable royalty rate), and Golden, "Patent Trolls,"supra note 6, at 2115 (same).
261 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 807 (criticizing current law as not always leading
to fair and reasonable outcomes).
262 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
263 See supra Part V.B.2.
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damages purposes the jury is presented only one prior negotiated
royalty where another accused infringer paid the patent owner $1
million. It seems likely that the jury would base its determination
of how the negotiating parties assessed the likelihood of liability
with how the jury itself assessed the closeness of its case. Thus,
further assume (3) the jury believes the negotiating parties
estimated the patent owner's chances of success at 50% on validity
and 50% on infringement, with no other relevant contingencies,
equal negotiation and litigation costs borne by those parties, and
equal risk aversion. What should the jury do according to an
assumption of liability built into a reasonable royalty calculation?
If infringement and validity are independent variables, then the
multiplier resulting from the assumption of liability should be
four; that is, the jury should multiply the negotiated royalty
reflecting 50% probability of validity and 50% probability of
infringement by four to obtain a reasonable royalty reflecting
certainty as to liability. The jury should therefore award a
reasonable royalty of $4 million.
For the second example, assume (1) an easy case in which a jury
concludes that an accused infringer is liable for patent
infringement, and (2) again, that for damages purposes the jury is
presented only one prior negotiated royalty where another accused
infringer paid the patent owner $1 million. It still seems likely
that the jury would base its determination of how the negotiating
parties assessed the likelihood of liability with how the jury itself
assessed the closeness of its case. Thus, (3) assume the jury
believes the negotiating parties estimated the patent owner's
chances of success at 100% on validity and 100% on infringement,
again with no other relevant contingencies, equal negotiation and
litigation costs borne by those parties, and equal risk aversion.
What should the jury do according to the assumption of liability
built into the reasonable royalty calculation? In this situation, the
multiplier resulting from the assumption of liability should not
exceed one; that is, the jury should not increase the negotiated
royalty at all because it already reflects certainty as to liability.
The jury should therefore award a reasonable royalty of $1 million.
Now, does anyone really think that in a close case a jury will
multiply pre-litigation royalties by four, while in a case of blatant
liability a jury will not increase pre-litigation royalties at all? It
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seems likely that the opposite would occur more often: that in close
cases the jury would not increase the royalty, but in blatant cases
of liability the jury would increase the royalty. That is, it seems
likely that juries will award damages based on the equities rather
than on the economic theory, even if given relatively clear jury
instructions to the contrary. And that is consistent with how some
litigators view the performance of juries in patent cases:
dispensing punishment regardless of jury instructions not to do
so. 264 In short, while the theory and math behind the assumption
of liability is clear, whether a jury would follow the theory and
math to its logical conclusion seems dubious.
Now consider the practical ability of damages experts to correct
a negotiated royalty to reflect an assumption of liability. How will
a damages expert decide whether to multiply negotiated royalties
by four, some other factor, or not adjust them at all? In particular,
where will the damages expert obtain information related to the
parties' estimations of the probabilities of liability?
In this regard, consider Thomas Cotter's summary of various
critiques of the law governing the award of reasonable royalties
and the Federal Circuit's decisions responding to those critiques. 265
He "attempts to place these decisions within a comprehensive
analytic framework for calculating damages and suggests some
remaining areas in need of reform."266 Within this framework, his
fourth principle "is that, in awarding reasonable royalties based on
the estimated terms that the parties would have agreed upon ex
ante, the trier of fact should consider variables that reflect the ex
ante value of the technology and that would have constrained real-
world negotiations as a general rule. '267  This principle is
consistent with identifying the expected value of patented
technology.
Cotter, however, purports to exclude the real-world
consideration of "parties' ex ante probability estimates of patent
validity, enforceability, and infringement" using the assumption of
264 Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent
Infringement Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 484, 485 (2009) (claiming that
jurors may approach damages deliberations with a desire to punish the infringer).
265 See Cotter, Four Principles, supra note 6, at 731-34.
266 Id. at 734.
267 Id. at 741.
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liability.268 He believes considering probability estimates "would
lead to incorrect calculations in court"269 because "[s]tandard
analysis shows that not making this assumption at trial, after the
patentee has already borne the risk that the court would find the
patent invalid or not infringed, would in effect amount to double
discounting."270  As a result, Cotter believes "the trier of fact
should assume that, at the time of the hypothetical negotiations,
the patentee and the would-be user believed the patent to be valid
and infringed."271  In effect, he argues that the assumption of
liability is necessary to assess reasonable royalties correctly.
Cotter's argument supports the assumption of liability, and it
makes economic sense to do so, along with other assumptions to
eliminate the inherent circularity in the hypothetical negotiation
construct, as I have discussed.272
But, to be clear, Cotter's purported exclusion of parties' ex ante
probability estimates is really no exclusion at all. To assess
properly the relevance of a real-world royalty in a negotiated
agreement, the trier of fact must consider the parties' ex ante
probability estimates. This is so because (in my simplified
examples) the trier of fact must multiply the real world royalty by
the inverse of the discount factor reflected in the parties' ex ante
agreement. If the trier of fact does not do so, the trier of fact
builds into the reasonable royalty the parties' agreed discount
based on the probability of liability.
So where will the jury or damages expert turn? Consider the
damages expert. She surely cannot get the proper adjustment
from the parties' technical experts addressing infringement and
validity. Given the discoverability of experts' conversations,
absent delay of damages discovery until after a liability
determination and perhaps even if there is this delay, it seems
highly likely that the patent owner's technical experts will tell its
damages expert that the probability of infringement and validity
was and is 100%, while the accused infringer's technical experts
268 Id. at 752.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 752-53. This is a reference to the same "double-discounting" that I have already
discussed. See supra note 148. In reality, the discounting is not limited to a double-
discounting. See supra note 148.
271 Cotter, Four Principles, supra note 6, at 753.
272 See supra Part V.B.2.
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will tell its damages expert that the probability of each was and is
0%. (This, despite the fact that (a) a patent owner would want any
negotiated royalty increased, which would require a determination
that a negotiated royalty reflected a discount based on probable
invalidity and non-infringement; and (b) an infringer would not
want any negotiated royalty increased, which would require a
determination that a negotiated royalty reflected no discount
based on agreed validity and infringement. Presumably both sides
would rather win on liability than win on the factor used to
increase reasonable royalties.)
Documentary evidence contemporaneous with the negotiations
of royalties may be the only realistic possibility. It may constitute
reliable evidence indicating the extent to which negotiating parties
discounted an agreed royalty based on risk. For example, they
may have done so based upon identified concerns with invalidity,
non-infringement, and equitable defenses. I have found one
example of a case where a damages expert was able to point to
documentary evidence showing what parties to a patent license
agreement may have estimated to be the probability of liability at
the time of their negotiations.27 3 But it seems unlikely that many
damages experts would be able to point to any reliable
documentary evidence on point. Rather, it seems likely that a
patent owner would seek to include self-indulging statements in
license agreements regarding large discounts provided given
relevant risks, so as to set the stage for large multiplications of
negotiated royalties in later infringement litigation. But given the
assumption of liability, any negotiated royalty should be adjusted
given real-world discounts based on the probability of liability, and
each damages expert must be able to point to some reliable basis
for any opinion indicating that a particular increase is appropriate
for the jury to adopt.27 4
273 See Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 WL 2417367,
at *7 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing a damages expert to rely upon "charts or other
information.., that were presented during various license negotiations" and reflected a
33% discount to support an opinion that a reasonable royalty should be three times the
negotiated royalty of 1%).
274 FED. R. EVID. 702 (establishing requirements for admission of expert testimony);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (holding that courts must
ensure that all scientific testimony is reliable).
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Significantly, these difficulties for juries and damages experts
might be eliminated, or at least reduced, by focusing on valuation
of patented technology, and particularly its actual value, in the
first place. In short, the assumption of liability-and the other
assumptions I have identified 275 that would direct the hypothetical
negotiation construct away from the value of patent rights and
toward the value of patented technology-attempts to redirect the
hypothetical negotiation construct so that it focuses on the salient
issue, the value of the patented technology. Indeed, by distracting
from the relevant question, the hypothetical negotiation construct
inserts a perhaps intractable problem into the analysis: how much
to inflate negotiated royalties given real world risks and costs with
respect to proving liability for patent infringement, obtaining
orders for relief, and enforcing those orders to obtain monetary
damages and to prevent infringement. 276
C. REDUCING UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY
Focusing the analysis on the value of patented technology only
would also increase certainty and predictability, perhaps
dramatically. A problem with the Georgia-Pacific factors and the
hypothetical negotiation construct is that their flexibility leads to
great uncertainty.277 Uncertainty is seen as endemic in patent
law. 278 And it is particularly problematic given the fundamental
idea that companies and individuals will not make decisions to
invest in research and development-or at least will not do so
efficiently-absent clarity regarding whether they will be able to
obtain a sufficient return on their investments.27 9  But the
uncertainty created by the Georgia-Pacific factors and the
275 See supra Part V.B.2.
276 1 do not mean to argue for exclusion of consideration of negotiated royalties in
determinations of reasonable royalties, but instead to highlight the need to adjust
negotiated royalties using appropriate methods and data, and the difficulty of doing so
accurately and efficiently. The point is that this difficulty might be eliminated or reduced
by focusing in the first instance on the relevant question, the value of use of the patented
technology.
277 See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 808-09 (recognizing that some courts have
expressed disdain at the uncertainty generated by these factors).
273 S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers,
43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 749, 749 (2010).
279 See generally David 0. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law
Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415 (2013).
[Vol. 49:79
USING REASONABLE ROYALTIES
hypothetical negotiation are said to be "tremendous .... [given]
widely divergent royalty recommendations (and outcomes)."280 At
the time of any hypothetical negotiation over the value of patent
rights, "[t]here are two fundamental dimensions of uncertainty: 1)
uncertainty about the commercial significance of the invention
being patented, and 2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of
the legal right being granted."28 ' One proposed solution is to
eliminate some of the flexibility and, indeed, the hypothetical
negotiation construct itself to provide more certainty and
predictability. 28 2
Focusing on the value of patented technology rather than the
value of patent rights may reduce or eliminate the second area of
uncertainty, which is derived from risks associated with validity,
relief, and enforceability. The complete elimination of this
uncertainty, however, would require eliminating use of the
hypothetical negotiation because, even though its corrective
assumptions seek to reverse discounts based on these risks, the
corrective assumptions themselves involve significant uncertainty.
Likewise, the complete elimination of this uncertainty would
require eliminating use of comparable agreements because they
too require corrections to reverse discounts based on these risks.
Notably, however, the first area of uncertainty regarding the
commercial significance of the patented invention can also be
eliminated if the relevant value is the actual value rather than the
expected value that is perceived or forecasted at a time period just
before infringement or the decision to infringe. If this first area of
uncertainty is eliminated-and it is largely a creation of the law
rather than accounting or economics-reasonable royalty awards
would be much more predictable. This predictability might
encourage more investment in inventive efforts.
D. BOUNDING EXPERT TESTIMONY
No doubt one contributing factor to inaccuracy, uncertainty,
and unpredictability regarding reasonable royalties is the
280 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 809.
281 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 52, at 76.
282 See Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 811-12 (advocating elimination of the
hypothetical negotiation and proposing that courts instead consider all available evidence).
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relatively unbounded expert testimony and evidence allowed by
the Georgia-Pacific factors and the hypothetical negotiation
construct. Indeed, according to one critique, it is difficult to
exclude evidence or expert testimony "espousing virtually any
theory of reasonable royalty damages, no matter how
outlandish."28 3  One solution is to cabin the reasonable royalty
analysis by eliminating the hypothetical negotiation construct in
favor of an objective analysis grounded in economic theories of
valuation of patented technology, rather than valuation of patent
rights.28 4 Another, more limited reform is to encourage additional
gatekeeping by courts, including encouraging more use of Daubert
motions by parties, with the purpose of excluding expert testimony
embracing the value of patent rights rather than the value of
patented technology. 28 5
By narrowing the inquiry to the value of patented technology, it
might be possible to restrict the breadth of expert testimony
allowed on the subject of reasonable royalties. For example,
damages experts' reliance on comparable license agreements
relating to patents not asserted in the litigation (and therefore
relating to different technologies) reflects a focus on valuation of
patent rights rather than valuation of patented technology. In
short, the paradigm of valuing patented technology rather than
patent rights would provide a principled basis for courts to exclude
expert testimony.
E. IMPROVING SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
Another problem associated with the Georgia-Pacific factors
and the hypothetical negotiation is the difficulty they create for
substantive review of reasonable royalty determinations given
their inherent flexibility. 28 6 It has been said to be "extremely
difficult for judges to review a jury damage award for substantial
evidence, either on judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or on
283 Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632.
284 Jarosz & Chapman, supra note 5, at 811-12.
285 Cf. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12, at 23 (recommending that courts test the
admissibility of expert opinion by determining whether it would assist the trier of fact in
assessing the parties' hypothetical negotiation).




appeal."28 7 In the absence of the establishment of a new test for
determining reasonable royalties, 288 an indirect way to review jury
awards is to review the reliability of expert testimony under
Daubert.28 9
The ability of courts to review awards of reasonable royalties
may also be improved by focusing the law on the value of patented
technology. It might encourage analyses of the relevant
substantive question rather than analyses of the procedural
framework for determining the answer to the substantive
question. Indeed, much of the law governing reasonable royalties
seems to be focused on the procedure of the hypothetical
negotiation construct and the Georgia-Pacific factors rather than
the substance of economic analyses addressing the relevant
substantive question.290
F. REDUCING THE COST OF DETERMINATION
Patent infringement cases are expensive. 291 Complex damages
analyses no doubt contribute to the expense. The multitude of
Georgia-Pacific factors and the circular analysis required by the
hypothetical negotiation construct make analyzing damages in
patent infringement cases particularly difficult and, as a practical
matter, typically require expert testimony. One proposed solution
to reduce costs is to bifurcate patent infringement cases (not just
trials) between liability and damages, such that discovery
regarding damages experts does not occur unless and until patent
owners prove liability for infringement. The reality, however, is
that judges rarely bifurcate patent infringement trials, 292 and so it
does not seem likely that they would bifurcate entire cases. A
287 Id. at 632.
288 See id. at 629 (noting that the Georgia-Pacific test remains the "universally accepted
test for reasonable royalty damages").
289 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (requiring trial judges
to test the reliability of the foundation and relevance of expert testimony).
290 See supra Part V.A.2-3.
291 See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, supra note 54 (reporting results of a survey regarding
litigation costs and listing a median cost of $2 million for all patent infringements lawsuits
with between $1 million and $10 million at risk).
292 PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE § 8.1.1.3 (2d ed.
2012) ("In practice, most courts decline requests to bifurcate damages.").
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more limited proposal would restrict discovery related to damages
and impose a shifting of costs for additional discovery.293
Reduction of costs may be another benefit of focusing the
reasonable royalty analysis on the value of patented technology in
the first instance-rather than first on the value of patent rights
and then on how to modify the value of patent rights to reflect the
value of patented technology using corrective assumptions.
Translating from valuation of patent rights to valuation of
patented technology using corrective assumptions is difficult and,
regardless, juries may not do so. 294 By focusing on the relevant
question, the value of patented technology, in the first place, the
use of assumptions and the difficulty and expense associated with
translating between the two types of valuation might be avoided.
Within an analysis translating the value of patent rights to the
value of patented technology, default starting points, rebuttable
presumptions, or safe harbors might reduce expenses but also
reduce the accuracy and admissibility of the resulting valuations.
For example, if empirical studies indicate that parties usually
discount the value of use of patented technology by about 50%
given the risk of non-liability due to invalidity, non-infringement,
and other common defenses, then an appropriate factor to correct
for this discount when analyzing agreements alleged to be
comparable to a hypothetically-negotiated agreement might be
two. But of course in any particular case the appropriate factor
might not be two given the circumstances, and so it would seem
that both patent owners and accused infringers should be able to
challenge any factor based on an average given past data. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit recently rejected a similar method of short-
circuiting an economic analysis of damages in a patent case-the
so-called "25-percent rule" for distributing profits between patent
owners and licensees in hypothetical negotiations-and so at least
under current law there is little tolerance for these types of
potentially significant cost-saving mechanisms.
295
293 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(a) (2013), available at http:lwww.gpo.govl
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr3309rfs/pdfIBILLS-113hr3309rfs.pdf (proposing restrictive discovery
and requiring parties seeking additional discovery to bear the associated cost).
294 See supra notes 263-64.
295 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ('This court
now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a
[Vol. 49:79154
USING REASONABLE ROYALTIES
VII. RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
As David Opderbeck has recognized, "the patent damages
debate is really one of the front lines in a broader ideological and
theoretical debate about the fundamental nature of the patent
grant."296 Thus, one response to the suggestion that reasonable
royalties should reflect the value of patented technology only-and
not the value of patent rights-is the idea that patent law should
utilize and reflect property rules rather than liability rules.297 A
property rule requires a person wishing to remove a legal right
from its owner to buy it in a voluntary transaction at the
subjective price agreed to by the owner.298 A liability rule, by
contrast, contemplates a person paying an objectively-determined
amount of money to the owner of a legal right after unilaterally
destroying it.299 Awards of injunctions enforce property rules,
while awards of damages enforce liability rules.300
The assessment of compensatory damages enforces a liability
rule; any assessment of damages occurs after a determination of
liability for infringement, where the infringer has already
unilaterally destroyed the patent owner's right to exclude.
Determining reasonable royalties under the hypothetical
negotiation construct, however, applies a property rule-like
analysis, despite the fact that the infringer has already
unilaterally destroyed the right to exclude. This is because the
hypothetical negotiation construct focuses on identifying the value
of the patent owner's legal rights to the patent owner before
appropriation of the right to exclude.
Determining reasonable royalties by identifying only the value
of the patented technology would seemingly move away from a
fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation.").
296 David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 127, 137-38 (2009).
297 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972)
(distinguishing property rules from liability rules).
298 Opderbeck, supra note 296, at 160 (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at
1092).
299 Id. (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at 1092).
300 Eugene Kontrovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass
Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 764 (2004).
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property rule-like analysis. The focus would no longer necessarily
be on the subjective value to the patent owner of the patent
owner's legal rights at a time period before appropriation of the
right to exclude. The question, really, is the extent to which
reasonable royalties should move away from a property rule-like
analysis. For example, a reasonable royalty analysis could focus
on the objective value to society of the patented technology after
unilateral appropriation of the right to exclude, rather than the
subjective value to the patent owner. Or a reasonable royalty
analysis could become something in between a property rule-like
analysis and a pure liability analysis by focusing on the subjective
value to the patent owner of the patented technology after
unilateral appropriation of the right to exclude. Indeed, the extent
to which reasonable royalties should move away from a property
rule-like analysis relates to the open questions I have already
identified. 301
There are reasons to prefer a more liability rule-like analysis
over a more property rule-like analysis for reasonable royalties.
These reasons reflect some of the same problems I have already
identified that point in favor of valuing patented technology over
patent rights. In a hypothetical negotiation focused on valuation
of patent rights, there is the problem of holdout. The patent
owner, for example, may hold out by demanding a greater share of
the potential infringer's profits given the existence of
complementary technologies. There is also the problem of free
riding. A potential infringer, for example, may decline licensing
patented technology in the belief that the relevant patent is
invalid and in the hope that a third party will invalidate the
relevant patent, or at least offer smaller royalties than acceptable
to the patent owner given different estimations of the possibility of
invalidity. There too is the problem of transaction costs. High
negotiation costs may serve as a barrier to transactions or inflate
the ability of patent owners to extract value from potential
infringers. For these reasons, the hypothetical ex ante, market-
based negotiation of patent rights may not succeed in allowing for
efficient use of the patented technology-use of the patented
technology by the most efficient user. In place of this hypothetical
301 See supra Part V.C.
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market, a liability rule may allow for more efficient use.
Relatedly, an assessment of reasonable royalties based on the
value of the patented technology would favor the basic purpose of
allowing for efficient use of patented technology as well as the
additional goal of incentivizing invention. 3 2 And this would be
consistent with the utilitarian-rather than natural rights-goal
of "promot[ing] the Progress of ... useful Arts."30 3
In some regards, however, the shift to a technology-focused
analysis of reasonable royalties might actually act more like a
property rule. That is, if valuing patented technology rather than
patent rights would increase reasonable royalty awards (by, for
example, eliminating discounting due to risk of liability, relief, and
enforcement), then potential infringers might refrain from
unilaterally appropriating the right to exclude and instead engage
in ex ante negotiations with the patent owner to license the right
to use the patented technology at a lower royalty.
Moreover, regardless of the extent to which reasonable royalties
should reflect the characteristics and usefulness of liability rules-
a somewhat ironic question in the first place given that reasonable
royalties are the result of imposition of a liability rule-the
quintessential property rule still exists. Injunctive relief is
available even if reasonable royalties focus on the value of
patented technology. 30 4 And injunctive relief requires an infringer
wishing to remove the right of the patent owner to exclude the
infringer from using the patented technology to buy that right
from the patent owner in a real (no longer hypothetical) voluntary
transaction at the subjective price agreed to by the patent
owner.
305
302 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at 1110 (recognizing that a liability rule
promotes both efficiency and innovation).
303 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
304 While the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 391-92 (2006), eliminated the presumption that injunctive relief should follow a
finding of liability, injunctive relief is still available.
305 An exception is when courts stay injunctive relief on the condition that infringers pay
ongoing royalties to patent owners, where the ongoing royalties are determined by the
court. See, e.g., Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Greatbatch Ltd., 599 F.3d 1308, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing how the district court stayed the injunction, conditioning the
stay on a deposit of an ongoing royalty into an escrow account or the court registry). An
assessment of ongoing royalties probably should reflect a property rule-like analysis in
these circumstances because they replace injunctive relief. Thus, there are certainly limits
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Another objection might be that a technology-based analysis of
reasonable royalties seems less like a damages analysis and more
like a value analysis.306 Lost royalties-for example, unadjusted
established royalties-seem to represent the extent to which a
patent owner was damaged by an infringer declining to pay a
negotiated royalty and instead infringing. As I have shown,
however, the history of reasonable royalties reflects a movement
toward a conception of reasonable royalties that focuses on the
value of the patented technology rather than on the value of
patent rights. Indeed, while the hypothetical negotiation construct
contemplates the patent owner and the infringer negotiating over
the value of patent rights, the assumption of liability purposefully
increases the damages award above what an actual negotiation
over patent rights would contemplate. The very goal of this
assumption is to translate a valuation of patent rights to a
valuation of patented technology only. Regardless, a technology-
based analysis of reasonable royalties is still a damages
analysis. 30 7  While reasonable royalties may not be actual
to the idea of pushing monetary remedies further toward valuation of patented technology
and away from valuation of patent rights.
306 Ted Sichelman, for example, in defense of his theory that, as a normative matter,
patent remedies should reflect the goal of creating innovation incentives, concedes that, as a
descriptive matter, "the Patent Act enshrines the tort law compensatory rationale right into
the statutory framework for damages." Sichelman, supra note 21, at 567. It certainly does.
But Sichelman focuses on the portion of 35 U.S.C. § 284 that governs awards of lost profits,
and specifically the language that courts should award "damages adequate to compensate
for infringement." Id. at 566-67 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012)). The remainder of the
statutory language ("but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer") applies to reasonable royalties, and it is less clear whether
reasonable royalties must always be exactly compensatory in the sense of exactly reflecting
lost royalties-and not just as a textual matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). Indeed, as I
have shown, courts awarding reasonable royalties have sought to increase lost royalties
given problems with discounting, circularity, and the creation of an incentive to infringe.
See supra Part IV.B. Thus, consistent with this precedent, there appears to be room within
the Patent Act to award reasonable royalties that reflect the value of patented technology.
307 A related objection might be that a conception of reasonable royalties as valuing
patented technology from the perspective of the infringer effectively disgorges the infringer's
benefit of use of patented technology. This, so the argument would go, is improper because
Congress eliminated disgorgement of profits "as such" as a remedy for infringement of
utility patents. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505
(1964) (plurality opinion) ('The purpose of the [statutory] change [in 1946] was precisely to
eliminate the recovery of profits as such and allow recovery of damages only."). But see
Caprice L. Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent
Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 653, 685 (2010) (arguing that patent owners should be able
to obtain disgorgement of profits). But the relevant report of the House of Representatives
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damages, they are still general damages, 308 or what may be called
presumed damages or estimated damages; they represent a legal
construct not exactly reflective of the extent to which the patent
owner was actually harmed by a decision not to license and
instead to infringe. 30 9 Rather, we effectively presume that the
patent owner and infringer would be able to predict with perfect
accuracy the result of the infringement trial and agree upon a
royalty that is equal to the value of the patented technology. In
this sense, it is an imperfect estimate of the patent owner's actual
damages.31 0
indicates that an infringer's profits may, at a minimum, be considered as an element of
general damages. See H.R. REP. No. 1587, at 2 (1946) ("[T]he bill would not preclude the
recovery of profits as an element of general damages."). Regardless, as I have indicated, it
is an open question whether the relevant perspective for valuing the patented technology
should be the infringer's perspective. See supra Part V.C.1.
308 See H.R. REP. No. 1587, at 1 (1946) ("The object of the bill is to make the basis of
recovery in patent-infringement suits general damages, that is, any damages the
complainant can prove, not less than a reasonable royalty, together with interest from the
time infringement occurred, rather than profits and damages." (emphasis added)); U.S.
Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) ('This damage or compensation
is not, in precise terminology, a royalty at all, but it is frequently spoken of as a 'reasonable
royalty'; and this phrase is a convenient means of naming this particular kind of damage. It
may also be well called 'general damage'; that is to say, damage not resting on any of the
applicable, exact methods of computation but upon facts and circumstances which permit
the jury or the court to estimate in a general, but in a sufficiently accurate, way the injury
to plaintiff caused by each infringing sale." (emphases added)); see also Suffolk Co. v.
Hayden, 70 U.S. 315, 319 (1865) ("There being no established patent or license fee in the
case, in order to get at a fair measure of damages, or even an approximation to it, general
evidence must necessarily be resorted to. And what evidence could be more appropriate and
pertinent than that of the utility and advantage of the invention over the old modes or
devices that had been used for working out similar results? With a knowledge of these
benefits to the persons who have used the invention, and the extent of the use by the
infringer, a jury will be in possession of material and controlling facts that may enable
them, in the exercise of a sound judgment, to ascertain the damages, or, in other words, the
loss to the patentee or owner, by the piracy, instead of the purchase of the use of the
invention." (emphasis added)).
309 See Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403,
1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("When a 'reasonable royalty' is the measure [of damages], the amount
may again be considered a factual inference from the evidence, yet there is room for exercise
of a common-sense estimation of what the evidence shows would be a 'reasonable' award.").
310 See, e.g., Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1894) ("In
this class of patents there are necessarily no data from which the value of a royalty can be
calculated with mathematical certainty. The damages here, like damages in many other
classes of cases, are calculable upon such evidence as it is in the nature of the case possible
to produce. The plaintiff was clearly entitled to damages for the infringement. If there had
been an established royalty, the jury could have taken that sum as the measure of damages.
In the absence of such royalty, and in the absence of proof of lost sales or injury by
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Moreover, there does not appear to be anything improper about
awarding presumed or estimated damages. By doing so, courts
avoid difficulty and expense. An analysis of actual harm, for
example, would be even more complex than the current reasonable
royalty analysis, which typically requires a jury to select a royalty
rate and apply it to a royalty base in the form of the actual sales of
the infringer. The current statute requires this focus on the actual
use of the patented technology by the infringer. 311 A technically
accurate measure of actual damages, by contrast, would require a
complete (and completely hypothetical) reconstruction of the
relevant market to identify what the actual sales volume would
have been had the patent owner and the infringer negotiated the
royalty, had the royalty affected the sales price, and had the sales
price affected the sales volume of the infringer. 312  Like the
statute's focus on the actual sales of the infringer, valuation of
patented technology likewise reduces difficulty and expense in
determining a reasonable royalty, as I have described, while also
satisfying the concerns judges have expressed with
undercompensation. 313
Finally, one might argue that valuation of patent rights would
infect a system built upon valuation only of patented technology.
Consider the following example, where we, for now, assume that
the goal of the reasonable royalty calculation is to identify the
value of the patented technology as compared to the next-best non-
infringing alternative. 314 Suppose a damages expert working with
a technical expert determines that the only (and therefore the
next-best) alternative to the patented technology is itself patented.
One response to this situation would include identifying the cost of
licensing the next-best alternative patented technology to make it,
effectively, non-infringing for purposes of the reasonable royalty
competition, the only measure of damages was such sum as, under all the circumstances,
would have been a reasonable royalty for the defendant to have paid.").
311 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (requiring "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer').
312 See SCHLICHER, supra note 230, §§ 13:149-:151 (discussing how to measure damages
accurately).
313 See supra Part V.A. An answer to the question whether the patent owner is entitled
to the full value of the use of the patented technology by the infringer would reduce
additional uncertainty, as would answers to all of the open questions that I have identified.
314 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 12, at 22.
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computation. This response would itself involve consideration of a
hypothetical negotiation, which would necessarily include
determining the likelihood that the other patent is valid and
infringed and the ability of the patent owner to extract value from
threatening litigation and potential injunctive relief, among all of
the other components of a negotiation of patent rights. 315 There is
a solution to this apparent problem, however. To maintain a
technology-focused (rather than rights-focused) reasonable royalty
analysis, one would need to abandon the constraint requiring the
next-best alternative to be unpatented. In other words, one might
compare the value of use of the patented technology under
consideration with the value of use of the next-best alternative to
the patented technology, regardless of whether the next-best
alternative is patented. By doing so, one would avoid the need to
determine the cost of licensing the next-best alternative patented
technology and therefore all of the problems associated with
valuing patent rights.
In short, there are significant practical reasons to consider the
alternative paradigm of focusing the law governing reasonable
royalties on the value of patented technology only, rather than on
the value of patent rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since the 1800s, the law governing the award of reasonable
royalties in patent cases has been moving from a traditional
paradigm focused on valuing patent rights toward an alternative
paradigm focused exclusively on valuing use of patented
technology. The assumption of validity associated with the
hypothetical negotiation construct, for example, focuses the
analysis on the value of the patented technology. So too does the
exclusion of litigation-induced settlement agreements that reflect
the value of avoiding risk and expense associated with litigation.
These constraints respectively eliminate from reasonable royalty
calculations the value associated with an infringer's threat of
challenging a patent's validity in litigation and a patent holder's
315 Tom Cotter highlighted this scenario in discussions with me about whether a version of
the problem of valuing patent rights would "infect" a valuation system purportedly built
upon valuing only patented technology.
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threat of seeking injunctive and monetary relief. What is left is
the value of the patented technology. Indeed, there is reason to
think that, ideally, courts should award compensatory damages-
whatever their form-equal to the marginal incremental value of
the use of patented technology; doing so would avoid
undercompensation associated with nominal damages and
established royalties, would refrain from creating incentives to
infringe and litigate, and would permit courts to create incentives
to innovate.
The conversion to this alternative paradigm-a fully
technology-focused inquiry-however, is not yet complete. If, as a
substantive matter, the focus of the reasonable royalty calculation
should be on the value of the patented technology, how would the
law change? It probably would dispense with a mode of
calculation-the hypothetical negotiation construct-that focuses
on the value of patent rights, or at least substantially rethink it.
Left unchecked, the hypothetical negotiation construct
inappropriately undercompensates or overcompensates patent
owners. Even when properly checked, however, it requires
numerous assumptions that contradict the very basis for its use,
ease of conceptualization. The assumptions, therefore, undermine
its usefulness. Anyway, current law does not even include all of
the assumptions necessary to focus only on the value of patented
technology.
In short, the law is moving in the direction of asking juries and
courts to focus only on the value of patented technology, rather
than to engage in an expensive, distorted procedure-based analysis
that inherently focuses on a circular question-the value of patent
rights. Economists and legal scholars should consider the
normative basis for this alternative paradigm and address several
open questions related to its full adoption.
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